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ALABAMA LAW REVIEW 
Volume 56 Spring 2005 Number3 
POLICYMAKING BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 
Charles H. Koch, Jr. • 
INTRODUCTION 
Administrative agencies adjudicate massive numbers of individual dis-
putes, far exceeding the number resolved by courts. Generally, administra-
tive adjudications determine the individual rights and duties created through 
an administrative program. 1 Similar to the judicial process, the adjudicative 
function of the administrative process involves a substantial amount of 
agency policy. However, despite its importance, the development of policy 
within the agency adjudicative machinery is little understood, even by the 
administrative adjudicative personnel engaged in it. Therefore, a close look 
at the policymaking function and the responsibility of administrative adjudi-
cators, especially those at the hearing level, is needed. 2 
To some extent, administrative policymaking is similar to judicial law-
making in the general common-law system.3 Thus, this Article looks to 
* Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law. B.A., University 
of Maryland, 1966; J.D., George Washington University, 1969; LL.M, University of Chicago, 1975. I 
would like to thank Michael Asimow, John Hardwicke, William Moran, Jim Rossi, and Sidney Shapiro 
for their valuable comments. 
I. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr 14 (1947) 
("[A]djudication is concerned with the determination of past and present rights and liabilities."); see Paul 
Verkuil,A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739,739 n.l (1976). 
2. ''The term 'policy' encompasses a wide variety of decisions that advance or protect some collec-
tive goal of the community as a whole (as opposed to those decisions that respect or secure some indi-
vidual or group right)." I CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ANDPRAcncE 6 (2d ed. 1997) 
(citing Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1059 (1975), reprinted in RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82 (1977)); see HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 141 (William Eskridge & Philip 
Frickey eds., 4th ed. 1994) (stating that "[a] policy is simply a statement of objective."). Setting policy is 
the most important function assigned to agencies. James Landis declared: "The ultimate test of the ad-
ministrative [institution] is the policy that it formulates; not the fairness as between the parties of the 
disposition of a controversy on a record of their own making." JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCESS 39 (1938). 
3. See HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 164 (''The body of decisional law announced by the courts 
in the disposition of these [individual] problems tends always to be the initial and continues to be the 
underlying body of law governing the society."). 
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studies of that lawmaking process, and draws on insightful theoretical works 
to aid in conceptualizing the issues.4 Empirical studies on the influences and 
motivations behind judicial decisionmaking begin the inquiry into adminis-
trative policymaking.5 However, the substantial differences between judicial 
lawmaking and administrative policymaking require this Article's analysis 
to ultimately reach beyond the implications of these studies. 
Administrative agencies usually have considerable policymaking re-
sponsibility and hence administrative adjudicators operate in policy-rich 
environments. The agency's substantial policymaking role serves to compli-
cate the adjudicator's policy function more so than the conventional judici-
ary. While administrative adjudicative processes follow a hierarchy similar 
to the judicial process, the adjudicators throughout administrative adjudica-
tions-from the hearing level to administrative review-have more policy-
related responsibilities than their counterparts in the conventional judiciary. 
However, the role of the courts in administrative adjudications further com-
plicates the policymaking aspect of administrative adjudications. Although a 
court's role is closely confined by the judicial review doctrine, it necessarily 
injects the courts and conventional judges into this perpetually active poli-
cymaking environment. Thus the administrative judiciary, in this case in-
corporating courts, works in a complex and dynamic policymaking context. 
Take for example the mundane case of the Sunbeam grill.6 Safeway 
Bread held a memorial day outing for its employees. Safeway purchased a 
Sunbeam gas grill for the hamburgers and hotdogs. The specifications for 
the grill called for a twenty-pound gas tank. Safeway's head of maintenance 
decided that a twenty-pound tank was inadequate and adapted the grill to 
use a forty-pound tank. Unfortunately, an Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) compliance officer attended the cookout. He con-
cluded the grill as adapted violated the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
of 1970 (OSH Act) and issued a ciatation. Safeway requested a hearing with 
the Occupational Safety and Health Revew Commission (OSHRC), a sepa-
rate agency designed to adjudicate such violations. Safeway argued that its 
4. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court 
Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. I (1994); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior 
Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 852-54 (1994); Evan H. Caminker, Allocating the Judicial 
Power in a "Unified Judiciary," 78 TEx. L. REV. 1513, 1515 (2000); DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at chap. 4; HART & SACKS, supra note 2; Federick Schauer, Precedent, 39 
STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987) [hereinafter Schauer, Precedent); Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, 
and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 615 (2000) [hereinafter 
Schauer, Incentives]. 
5. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology. and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 
I 717 ( 1997) [hereinafter Revesz, Environmental Regulation]; Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, 
and the D.C. Circuit: A Reply to Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, 85 VA. L. REV. 805 (1999) [hereinafter 
Revesz, Ideology); Richard L. Revesz, Litigation and Settlement in the Federal Appellate Courts: Impact 
of Panel Selection Procedures on Ideologically Divided Couns, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 685 (2000) [herein-
after Revesz, Litigation and Settlement]; Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and 
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, !07 YALE. L.J. 2155, 
2174 (1998). 
6. Sec'y of Labor v. Safeway, Inc., OSHRC Docket No. 99-0316, 2000 Occupational Safety and 
Health Decisions (CCH) 'I[ 32,157 (July 12, 2000) [hereinafter Safeway]. 
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conduct should be governed by OSHA's Compressed Gases Standards.7 
These standards state that "[t]he in-plant handling, storage, and utilization 
of all compressed gases ... shall be in accordance with Compressed Gas 
Association Pamphlet P-1-1965."8 The pamphlet did not proscribe adapting 
gas grills to accommodate larger gas tanks. However, OSHA argued that the 
use of the Sunbeam grill did not fall within the OSHA standard's definition. 
Thus, OSHA urged that Safeway had violated OSH Act § S(a)(l): "Each 
employer ... shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place 
of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or 
are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees .... "9 
After a hearing, the administrative judge concluded that Safeway violated 
the Act.10 In the course of deciding this trivial dispute, the administrative 
judge made significant policy-related choices. These choices arguably add 
to the agency law regarding both the legislation and the agency's policy 
pronouncement. If reviewed, the review authority would have to develop or 
at least confirm these choices and thereby further add to the body of agency 
law. Thus, the Safeway example confirms that any administrative adjudica-
tive, no matter how trivial, may confront and even contribute to the evolu-
tion of administrative policy. 
In any administrative case, the numerous agency policymaking proc-
esses present the administrative judiciary with a complex array of policy 
pronouncements. Collectively called "rulemaking," most agencies have 
processes designed to carry out these responsibilities (including any formal 
policy statements). Rulemaking is a quasi-legislative process, and its goal is 
to make general pronouncements with future effect. 11 Agency policy is of-
ten developed through rulemaking. Rules, policy statements, and similar 
pronouncements-like legislation-often impact the public through indi-
vidual adjudications. However, like legislation, these devices are limited in 
the number of individual disputes they can resolve. The administrative judi-
ciary must apply legislative and regulatory policy, and in the process of 
doing so resolve interstitial policy issues raised by both. Even though most 
agencies possess general policymaking processes, administrative adjudica-
tions remain a critical part of administrative policymaking. At this level, 
legislation is somewhat removed and the agency policy pronouncements 
7. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.102 (2004). 
8. /d. 
9. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (2000). The OSHA Field Operations Manual set out a four-part test for 
finding a violation of this "general duty clause." OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL pt. N -4 (6th ed. 
1994). 
10. Safeway, supra note 6. 
11. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act§ 551(4) provides: '"[R]ule' means the whole or a 
part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to imple-
ment, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or·practice require-
ments of an agency .... " 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2000) [hereinafter APA). The 1961 Model State Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, after which most state APAs are modeled provides: "'[R]ule' means each agency 
statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy, or describes 
the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any agency." MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE Acr, 1961 Act§ 1(7), 15 U.L.A. 185 (2000) [hereinafter 61 MSAPA]. 
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provide another tier of general pronouncement. Administrative adjudicators 
must honor legislative policy and administrative policy resolutions, and at 
the same time exercise the expansive policymaking roles they hold. This 
Article explores and argues for the enhancement of the policy contribution 
of administrative adjudicators. 
I. PLACE OF ADJUDICATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY 
Well-established administrative law doctrine holds that agencies have 
considerable authority in deciding how to proceed. 12 For generations, this 
doctrine has dictated that agencies may develop policy in adjudication as 
well as rulemaking. The doctrine and its impact on policymaking in admin-
istrative adjudications is best explained by a few of the classic cases associ-
ated with its development. 
Faced with the question presented in its most basic form, the Supreme 
Court, in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery13 ("Chenery If'), 
definitively established the authority to make agency' law in adjudication. 14 
The SEC refused to approve the reorganization of a utility company seeking 
reorganization under the recently enacted Public Utility Holding Company 
Act because company insiders received special advantages from their pur-
chases. Neither the Act nor any SEC rule proscribed the conduct. Although 
there was no fraud involved, the SEC took the opportunity to establish for 
the first time a policy against insider trading. 
In a prior case, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery15 
("Chenery f'), the Court stated that "before transactions otherwise legal can 
be outlawed or denied their usual business consequences, they must fall 
under the ban of some standards of conduct proscribed by an agency of 
government authorized to prescribe such standards."16 Chenery II dispelled 
the notion that this language required an agency (where the standard is un-
clear) to make a general rule before proceeding through case-by-case en-
forcement adjucations. In Chenery II, the Court stated: "The absence of a 
general rule or regulation governing management trading during reorganiza-
tion did not affect the Commission's duties in relation to the particular pro-
posal before it."17 Thus, the Court held that the SEC may develop adminis-
trative policy while adjudicating an individual dispute in addition to devel-
oping such policy through generalized rulemaking. 18 
12. For further discussion see I KOCH, supra note 2, § 2.12, for an explanation of an agency's 
choice between rulemaking and adjudication. 
13. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) [hereinafter Chenery II]. 
14. See id. at 203. 
15. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1942) [hereinafter Chenery 1]. 
16. /d. at 92-93. 
17. Chenery II, supra note 13, at 201. 
18. This making of agency-law or administrative policymaking must be sharply distinguished from 
statutory interpretation. The distinction is crucial to the authority of federal courts and hence it has been 
well expressed in that context. Field, for example, observed that "'federal common. law' ... refer[s) to 
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Justice Jackson, dissenting in Chenery II, would have required the SEC 
to give notice of the agency law before applying the law19-in short, Jack-
son would have required the agency to first make a generally applicable 
"rule." Tersely commenting on the issue, Jackson suggested some problem 
with an agency making agency law through cases under any circumstances: 
"Even if the Commission had, as the Court says, utilized this case to an-
nounce a new legal standard of conduct, there would be hurdles to be 
cleared .... "20 Implicit from the remainder of the opinion, Jackson thought 
it inherently unfair to order forfeiture of property based on law created in 
the same case prohibiting the conduct. Indeed, such post hoc condemnation 
seems questionable in the abstract, but the common-law process itself con-
templates such case-by-case lawmaking.21 In light of this tradition, and per- • 
haps more practically because the administrative process needs the policy 
development alternative even more so than the judicial process, federal 
courts have refused to second guess procedural choices of agencies.22 In· 
other words, federal law does not "require rulemaking."23 
any rule of federal law created by a court ... when the substance of that rule is not clearly suggested by 
federal enactments---constitutional or congressional." Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of 
Federal Common Law, 99 HARv. L. REV. 881, 890 (1986) (emphasis omitted). Merrill expressed the 
necessary contrast between lawmaking and interpretation: '"Federal common law' ... means any federal 
rule of decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal text-whether or not that 
rule can be described as the product of 'interpretation' in either a conventional or an unconventional 
sense." Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 5 
(1985). Since agencies have substantial policymak:ing authority, the distinction is crucial to allocating 
authority between agencies and courts. While courts dominate statutory interpretation, they must gi've 
considerable difference to agency policy decisions. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administra· 
tive Policymaking, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375, 376 (2003). This basic doctrine makes an understand-
ing of the workings of administrative policymaking all the more important. 
19. Chenery II, supra note 13, at 217. 
20. Id. at 215. Jackson did not elaborate because that was "something the Commission expressly 
declined to do." /d. 
21. However, even in the common-law system, courts are constrained. Federal courts, for example, 
rarely have the authority to make law but are confined to some variety of interpretation. ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, fEDERALJuRISDICfiON § 6.1 (4th ed. 2003); see John f. Duffy, Administrative Common 
Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEx. L. REV. 113, 121 (1998) (explaining the development of judge-made 
law and its relevance to the administrative system). 
22. E.g., United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 580 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Agencies have 
discretion to choose between rulemaking and adjudication."); Davis v. EPA, 348 F.3d 772, 785 (9th Cir. 
2003) ("Absent express congressional direction to the contrary, agencies are free to choose their proce-
dural mode of administration."). 
23. While required rulemak:ing has not been adopted in the federal system, it is often required either. 
by legislation or judicial decision in state administrative law. 1 KocH, supra note 2, § 2.12. Statutes in. 
some states require prior notice of the law, sometimes called "required rulemaking." E.g., FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 120.54(1) (Harrison 1999); Megdal v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 605 P.2d 273, 274 
(Or. 1980); Cleveland Freight Lines, Inc. v. Ohio PUC, 402 N.E.2d 1192, 1195 (Ohio 1980) ("[W]heii 
there is not a definite commission rule, order, or decision forbidding a particular practice, the imposition 
of a substantial penalty is unreasonable."); accord, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. v. Utah PSC, 737 P.2d 
983,986 (Utah 1987). Bonfield, one of the drafters of the 1981 model state act, has long advocated some 
requirement of rulemaking. ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING§ 4.4.1 
(1986); see also Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and Institutional 
Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 551, 572 (2001) ("One of the reasons for the proliferation of this doctrine in 
states ... may be that it allows better oversight of the rulemaking process, especially given the weak 
oversight capacity of state legislatures when agencies operate outside of their rulemaking processes."). 
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Since Chenery ll, the Court has continually affirmed the general princi-
ple that agencies have broad discretion to develop agency law through adju-
dication. The most important affirmation of this principle is found in NLRB 
v. Wyman-Gordon Co.24 The NLRB ordered Wyman-Gordon to furnish a 
list of names and addresses of employees eligible to vote in a "recognition" 
election. The order was based on a general pronouncement derived from a 
prior administrative adjudication, Excelsior Underwear. 25 The appellate 
court refused to enforce a subpoena in aid of an administrative action 
against Wyman-Gordon because it found that the order was based on a rule 
made in a prior adjudication and never promulgated according to proper 
rulemaking procedures. Reversing the appe11ate court, the Supreme Court 
refused to compel the agency to establish agency law through rulemaking 
process before applying it to an adjudication, affirming the principle of ad-
ministrative discretion to develop agency law in adjudication.Z6 To this day, 
this remains the law in the federal system.Z7 
Wyman-Gordon additionally softened the distinction between rule and 
precedent in the administrative adjudicative context. Formally, judgments in 
individual cases focus on resolving past issues in an individual dispute, 
while rules focus on future agency policy. Nonetheless, by definition, 
precedent has general applicability and future effect.28 More to the point, 
24. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969). 
25. Excelsior Underwear, 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). 
26. Strauss' observations about the increasing challenges to the common-law process are relevant to 
its administrative version: 
We could see a number of linked results from these challenges: a heightening of judicial dis-
cretion over what issues get decided; an emphasis on law-making rather than case-deciding as 
the basis on which this discretion gets exercised; a dramatically lowered exposure of trial and 
intermediate courts to principled public correction; and a temptation for the high court, then, 
to speak in simple terms it might expect to have broad impact rather than respond to the sub-
tle particulars of complex facts. 
Peter L Strauss, Courts or Tribunals? Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53 ALA. L. REv. 891. 894-
95 (2002). 
27. A plurality of the justices indicated that, but for the unique aspects of this particular case, they 
would require an agency to make a rule through rulemaking procedure rather than allow it to announce 
rules of general applicability in the course of an individual adjudication. Most administrative law practi-
tioners belived that if the question came up without the special facts in Wyman-Gordon, the Supreme 
Court would demand rulemaking procedures for general administrative pronouncements. This case 
arrived at the Supreme Court in the forrn of NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). Here 
again, the NLRB seemed to have set a rule without using rulemaking procedures. The Board certified 
buyers in the company's purchasing and procurement department as a bargaining unit. /d. at 269. The 
company argued that buyers had always been considered "managerial employees" and that the agency's 
decision changed the law. /d. The appellate court agreed and said that the agency must use rulemaking to 
change general agency policy. /d. The Supreme Court remanded the decision so that the NLRB could 
apply the proper legal standard, but it refused to require that the NLRB use rulemaking procedures. The 
Court said that an agency "is not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceed-
ing and that the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the 
[agency's] discretion." /d. at 294. Thus, the Court reaffirmed the well-established principle that an 
agency may develop policy through adjudication. 
While an adjudicative decision may have future effect as precedent, its primary purpose is to 
resolve the dispute and its effect is said to be retrospective. Unlike adjudicative decisions, administrative 
rules are prospective, and are intended to have future effect as well as general applicability. Bowen v. 
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218 (1988) (Scalia J., concurring). In a manual published 
shortly after the APA's enactment to advise federal agencies, the Attorney General explained the differ-
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adjudicators, especially the agency heads, often consciously aim to create 
agency law in their adjudicative decisions-although usually not so bla-
tantly as the NLRB in the Excelsior case. Justice Black, concurring in 
Wyman-Gordon, challenged the plurality's suggestion that an agency may 
not make a prospective pronouncement in an adjucation.29 Noting the fuzzy 
boundary between rulemaking and adjudication, Black observed: 
[I]n exercising its quasi-judicial function an agency must frequently 
decide controversies on the basis of new doctrines, not theretofore 
applied to a specific problem, though drawn to be sure from broader 
principles reflecting the purposes of the statutes involved and from 
the rules invoked in dealing with related problems. If the agency 
decision reached under the adjudicatory power becomes a prece-
dent, it guides future conduct in much the same way as though it 
were a new rule promulgated under the rule-making power ... ?0 
This affirmed the position Black took in a dissent some 26 years before in 
Chenery /, arguably the position adopted by the Court five years later in 
Chenery II?1 In Chenery /,Black asserted that an agency is free to "evolve" 
its law, relying on the wisdom of prior judicial opinion among other 
sources,
32 
"[t]hat the Commission has chosen to proceed case by case rather 
than by a general pronouncement does not appear to me to merit criticism .. 
. . That Act gives the Commission wide powers to evolve policy standards, 
and this may well be done case by case .... "33 The time span between these 
cases and the present has evolved this view into one of the most well-
established doctrines of adrninistrati ve law. 34 
ence: 
The object of the rule making proceeding is the implementation or prescription of law or pol-
icy for the future, rather than the evaluation of a respondent's past conduct. Typically, the is-
sues relate not to the evidentiary facts, as to which the veracity and demeanor of witnesses 
would often be important, but rather to the policy-making conclusions to be drawn from the 
facts. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT 14 (1947); see also United 
States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 244-46 (1973). 
29. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 775 (Black J., concurring) ("I see no good reason to impose any 
such inflexible requirement on the administrative agencies."). 
30. Jd. at 770-71. 
31. Jd. at 772. 
32. Chenery I, supra note 16, at 97-98. 
33. !d. at 99-100. 
34. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND 
PROCESS 279 (3d ed. 1999) ("[A]n agency can establish general rules applicable to large groups of 
people through an order issued in a proceeding conducted as an adjudication."); AlFRED C. AMAN, JR. & 
WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 102 (2001). 
The idea of rulemaking by adjudication is that over time and out of a sequence of adjudica-
tions aimed at discrete problems as they present themselves, agency standards of broad 
application should emerge. This notion ... has been sufficiently strong to make the case that 
an agency should have the discretion to determine whether a particular problem is better 
solved by rulemaking by making rules through adjudication. 
!d.; KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PiERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 6.8 ("Efforts 
to require rulemaking have failed in federal law."); 1 KOCH, supra note 2, § 2.12. 
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Thus, as it should be, policy is made in administrative adjudications just 
as it is made in common-law judicial processes. The common-law system 
recognizes the value of this interstitial policymaking. Because adjudicative 
policymaking takes place within administrative structures exercising con-
siderable policymaking responsibility, administrative adjudicators have both 
a richer opportunity and graver responsibility than their counterparts in the 
conventional judiciary. A careful analysis of this aspect of administrative 
adjudication requires considerable attention. Essentially, policymaking 
starts at the beginning of the adjudicative process, and administrative judges 
have a critical role in optimizing policymaking. Therefore, the focus must 
be on improving the administrative judges' understanding of their role in the 
process. 
II. THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 
As discussed above, administrative adjudications are part of the admin-
istrative policymaking process, and administrative policymaking is perva-
sive and dynamic. The next step is to look inside the adjudicative machinery 
at the distribution of policymaking responsibilities. Traditional judicial or-
ganization dictates the structure of the administrative adjudicative process, 
· and that structure helps us to understand the allocation of policymaking 
responsibility. The Anglo-American trial is the template for adjudications.35 
However, while administrative adjudications use the trial as a model, they 
may and often do deviate from that model, sometimes substantially.36 None-
theless, the basic structure replicates court systems in terms of the hierarchy 
of adjudicators as well as the trial-like hearing procedures employed. 37 
Therefore, an agency engaging in adjudications has a hearing-level adjudi-
cation, much like a trial court, and at least one opportunity for appeal within 
the agency. The administrative process may employ a nearly infinite num-
35. The trial-like model, or ''formal adjudication," is sometimes required by statute. E.g., APA, 
supra note 11, §§ 554, 556-57; 61 MSAPA, supra note II, § 9; MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATNE 
PROCEDURE ACT (1981) Article IV, chap. IT [hereinafter 81 MSAPA]. 
36. In developing procedural designs, administrative law has often been eclectic, especially in its 
early years. For that reason, it has looked with a more positive attitude and practical eye at the civil-law 
systems. Because this Article is about one of the functions of adjudicators, it sometimes makes reference 
to the judicial function and procedural usage of the civil-law system. References to the civil-law system 
free the inquiry from the common-law procedural dogma because the civil system is based on a very 
active role for trial-level judges. Henry Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1290 
(1975). The civil system is judge controlled, as opposed to the common-law model which is lawyer 
controlled. The civil system focuses on the judge and judges play the crucial role. It is called the "in-
quisitorial" model because its doctrines aim at gaining the truth. It is no less adversarial than the com-
mon-law "adversarial" model, as decisions are contested among judges as well as lawyers. The differ-
ence may be that the judges have a moral responsibility to assure an equal and fair process, a responsibil-
ity not just to ensure that the rules of the game are observed, but also that the decision is the best possi-
ble. In this fundamental sense, civil-law judges share a key ethic with administrative judges in many 
systems. 
37. See generally LLoYD D. MUSOLF, FEDERAL EXAMINERS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAW AND 
ADMINISTRATION (1953); Gerald M. Pops, The Judicialization of Federal Administrative Law Judges: 
Implications for Policymaking, 81 W.VA. L. REv. 169 (1979). 
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her of variations on this basic adjudicative structure and any discussion of 
the allocation of policymaking within the administrative adjudications must 
account for this structural diversity.38 However, this presents little difficulty 
for this discussion, because even very informal adjudicative processes have 
a hierarchy of adjudicators which match closely enough to conventional 
judicial organization. 
Analyzing the administrative adjudicative hierarchy requires some 
agreement on the terms used to distinguish adjudicative responsibilities. The 
administrative officials, at all levels, engaged in adjudicative decisionmak-
ing will be called "administrative adjudicators." These administrative adju-
dicators are distinguished from judiciary branch judges, collectively called 
"the courts" or "conventional judges." Hearin~-level administrative adjudi-
cators will be called "administrative judges."3 Higher-level administrative 
adjudicators will be called the "administrative review authority" or simply 
the "review authority .'.4° The pinnacle of authority in the agency will be 
termed the "agency head," referring to either a single official or a collegial 
body. The review authority may be the agency head or some individual or 
body delegated the authority to review the administrative judge's decision. 
In the end, the agency, as an institution, must adopt a policy position in or-
der for it to have weight and hence the administrative review authority, ei-
ther the agency head or its representative, has the final word-the power to 
speak for the "agency" as a whole.41 Thus, the hierarchical system central-
izes the policymaking authority in a superior review authority, but the ad-
ministrative judges, sitting at the initial adjudicative stage, necessarily play 
38. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,236 (2001) ("That feature is the great variety of 
ways in which the laws invest the Government's administrative arms with discretion, and with proce-
dures for exercising it, in giving meaning to Acts of Congress."). 
39. A literal reading of the Constitution may require Congress to vest all judicial functions in Article 
ill courts, but long tradition has established alternative federal courts and agencies with adjudicative 
functions. Richard Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article Ill, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 916, 916-17 (1988) (remarking that "Article ill literalism" is "unthinkable"). Many federal and 
state statutes refer to administrative adjudicative officials as 'judges" of some variety. 
40. The term "administrative judge" represents a search for a universal term. It includes all offi-
cials-federal, state or local-who have hearing-level adjudicative responsibilities, regardless of official 
title. The nature of the hearings over which they preside varies in the level of formality, and often their 
specific title is affected by the nature of the hearing. Administrative law has used any number of terms: 
hearing examiner, hearing officer, or some term including the word "judge." Previously, I have grouped 
them as "presiding officials." 2 KOCH, supra note 2, § 5.26. This term does not carry the necessary 
stature; these adjudicators are judges, even if they are not acting under Article III of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Increasingly, "administrative law judge (AU)" has been adopted as the generic term. Unfortu-
nately, the federal system creates some confusion because the term "administrative law judge" has 
become a special civil service category, whereas all other federal presiding officials are lumped together 
as "administrative judges." PAUL VERKUIL ET AL., THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 1 (1992); 
see also John H. Frye III, Survey of Non-AU Hearings Programs in the Federal Government, 44 
ADMIN. L. REV. 261 (1992). The distinction is necessary because AUs have special protection, whereas 
other presiding officials hired by agencies have no more than the usual civil service protection. States do 
not adopt this distinction and their law may employ any of a number of terms. To escape this morass, I 
have adopted "administrative judge" as a universal term. 
41. Daniel Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of an Altemati>e Agency 
Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965, 980 {1991) ('This role of the agency head as the final adjudi-
cating authority is recognized throughout the [Administrative Procedure] Act."). 
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a critical role. This Article adopts the perspective that all adjudicative offi-
cials act on and depend upon the work of administrative judges. 
A. Administrative Judges' Contribution to the Body of Agency Caselaw 
The role of the administrative judges is pivotal. Administrative judges 
cannot decide individual cases without finding and applying administrative 
policy.42 A sense of obedience to that policy is driven by the norms of sta-
bility and consistency regarding adjudicative decisions and equality among 
litigants, assuring that like cases are treated alike. On the other hand, a liv-
ing administrative policy regime requires constant adjustment. Wooden 
adherence to dictated policy tips the balance too far in favor of laissezfaire. 
The balance between growth and equal treatment pervades the adjudicative 
system. The interaction between the "inferior" and the "superior" adminis-
trative adjudicators dictates to some extent how that balance is struck in a 
particular administrative program. 43 · 
The common perception is that administrative adjudicators are likely to 
be too committed to the agency's positions.44 For example, veterans' cases 
give rise to the complaint that the agency appoints judges who are imbued 
42. While decorum demands that the administrative judges say that they take policy rather than 
make policy, this is no more true of administrative judges than it is of trial.Jevel judges. 
[W]hile the primary task of trial judges is factfinding, legal reasoning and interpretation of 
legal texts remains a vital part of the work of a federal district judge. Indeed, some research-
ers have concluded that the federal trial bench is a better-suited laboratory for study of judi-
cial discretion than the federal appellate courts. 
Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An 
Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1377, 1415 (1998) (citing Orley Ashenfelter, 
Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Back-
ground on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 263-64 (1995)). While administrative judges focus 
on factfinding, they often find the need to consider policy issues. Justice Scalia's list of judicial functions 
still works. He observed that, in addition to determining credibility, administrative judges 
perform many other important functions: they make findings of fact of an often extraordinar-
ily difficult nature, not primarily dependent upon the credibility of demeanor evidence; they 
make important decisions regarding statutory law and agency policy; they write opinions that 
marshal the facts and frame the issues in a comprehensible fashion; and they conduct pro-
ceedings so as to assure a full and informative record. 
Antonio Scalia, The AU Fiasco-A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 71 (1979) (emphasis added). "These 
functions are absolutely vital to the administrative process." !d. 
43. For example, a North Carolina statute requires the administrative judge to give "due regard to 
the demonstrated knowledge and expertise of the agency with respect to facts and inferences within the 
specialized knowledge of the agency." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34(a) (2005); see Julian Mann III, 
Administrative Justice: No Longer Just a Recommendation, 19 N.C. L. REV. 1639, 1651-52 (2001) 
(observing that demonstrating expertise often presents a problem). 
44. Daye's study provides support for this perception. Charles E. Daye, Powers of Administrative 
Law Judges, Agencies, and Courts: An Analytical and Empirical Assessment, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 
1617 (2001) ("Thus, the small proportion of decisions that favored the petitioners in the OAH is one part 
of the picture."); Parchman v. USDA, 852 F.2d 858,866 (6th Cir.l988). 
!d. 
[A] judge should be careful not to give the impression that a particular view of the law pre-
vents a careful consideration of the law and facts applicable to any given case. When an en-
tire career has been spent in the service of one governmental agency, it can be easy for a 
judge to slip into a stance that may appear to be advocating, rather than judging, those inter-
ests. 
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with the agency's culture.45 Nonetheless, the frequency with which adjudi-
cators actually disagree with agency policy is not particularly relevant to 
this discussion, although the impact of those disagreements and the distur-
bance in the administrative scheme are significant, even if they occur infre-
quently. Moreover, the point of inquiry is how free administrative judges 
should feel in venturing to disagree with agency policy.46 
1. Precedent 
This analysis begins with the question of the binding effect of agency 
law created through adjudication. Stare decisis is not the rule in administra-
tive adjudications.47 Thus, as a matter of doctrine, administrative adjudica-
tors are not required to follow administrative precedent.48 Rather, adminis-
trative law has developed a degree of flexibility in its approach to caselaw. 
On the other hand, agencies cannot ignore their prior cases.49 Thus, they are 
allowed to continually adjust their precedent so long as they apply the new 
view until faced with a sound reason for adjusting that view;50 they are held 
to precedent only until a change can be justified. 51 The effect of precedent is 
further weakened by the agency's authority to interpret it. An agency has 
the power to interpret its own precedent as well as to make justifiable ad-
45. James T. O'Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the Veterans Appeals Process is Needed to 
Provide Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 223, 228 (2001). 
46. Daye found that, while administrative judges agreed with the agency about three-quarters of the 
time, they disagreed in a significant number of cases. Daye, supra note 44, at 1616. 
47. Texas v. United States, 866 F.2d 1546, 1556 (5th Cir. 1989) ("An agency ... is not bound by 
the shackles of stare decisis to follow blindly the interpretations that it, or the courts of appeals, have 
adopted in the past."). 
48. S. Shore Hosp.,lnc. v. Thompson, 308 F.3d 91, 102 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that an agency may 
refine, reformulate, or even reverse its precedent based on new insights, changed circumstances, and the 
desire to correct a mistake). 
49. Borough of Columbia v. Surface Transp. Bd., 342 F.3d 222, 229 (3d Cir. 2003) ("If an agency 
departs from its own precedent without a reasoned explanation, the agency may be said to have acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously."); Ramaprakash v. FAA, 346 F.3d 1121, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("[A]gency 
action is arbitrary and capricious if it departs from agency precedent without explanation."); Consol. 
Edison Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 315 F.3d 316, 323 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("Normally, an 
agency must adhere to its precedents in adjudicating cases before it."). 
50. South Shore Hasp., Tnc., 308 F.3d at 102 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186-87 ( 1991 ), 
and Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.lns. Co., 463 U.S. 29,42 (1983)). 
51. Borough of Columbia, 342 F.3d at 229; Fertilizer lnst. v. Browner, 163 F.3d 774, 778 (3d Cir. 
1998); Utahns for Better Transp. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 305 F. 3d 1152, 1165 (I Oth Cir. 2002) 
("Agencies are under an obligation to follow their own regulations, procedures, and precedents, or 
provide a rational explanation for their departure.") (emphasis added); Ramapralw.sh, 346 F. 3d at 1124; 
British Steel PLC v. United States, 127 F.3d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1997). But see McClatchy Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. NLRB, 131 F.3d 1026, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (allowing an agency to overrule portions of 
prior decisions without extensive explanation), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). The explanation 
requirement varies with the circumstances of the individual case. "If ... an agency merely implements 
prior policy, an explanation that allows this court to discern 'the agency's path' will suffice." WLOS 
TV, Inc. v. FCC, 932 F.2d 993,995 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Or, if the court finds the past agency decisions to 
involve materially different situations, the agency's explanation need not be particularly elaborate. Hall 
v. McLaughlin, 864 F.2d 868, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The D.C. Circuit allowed an agency to "distinguish 
precedent simply by emphasizing the importance of considerations not previously contemplated, and that 
in so doing it need not refer to the cases being distinguished by name." Envtl. Action v. FERC, 996 F.2d 
401,411-12 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
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justments to the precedent.52 Thus, in application, administrative precedent 
has effect, but the effect is not binding, or stare decisis. 53 
Administrative law replaces formalism with an approach to caselaw that 
balances a range of values. Stare decisis recognizes, but overemphasizes, 
one of these values: stability. 54 The notion of stability serves the individual 
values of predictability and reliance.55 Undoubtedly, these considerations 
are important to a fair administrative system. Citizens should be able to rely 
on a current understanding of agency law and take action under some reli-
able prediction of administrative reaction. Administration should seek con-
sistency over time and within ·a program,56 yet each new precedent poten-
tially eliminates a viable option.57 Schauer, while recognizing the value of 
predictability, observed the trade-off between predictability and other val-
ues.58 He asks, without providing a generalized answer: "To what extent is a 
52. See Entergy Serv., fuc. v. FERC, 319 F.3d 536, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Cassell v. FCC, 154 F.3d 
478, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("An agency's interpretation of its own precedent is entitled to deference ... 
. "). 
53. A strict doctrine of stare decisis is not followed by modern courts-if it ever was. Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) ("The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the respect accorded to the 
judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law. It is not, however, an inexorable command."); see 
James C. Rehnquist, The Power That Shall be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution and 
the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 347 (1986); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in 
Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 91 (1991) ("These sources of 
indeterrninancy in dealing with precedents have the effect of enabling the Justices to engage in conscien-
tious disagreements over the scope of precedents, to consider new or renewed arguments, and to contrib-
ute to the evolution of constitutional doctrine."). Still, administrative adjudicators are free in principle as 
well as practicality. 
54. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 4, at 601 ("Arguments premised on the values of reliance, pre-
dictability, and decisional efficiency all share a focus on stability for stability's sake."). 
55. Predictability and stability are integral to assuring the rule of law. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
"The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18-21 (1997); Lon 
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,357 (1978). 
!d. 
[A]djudication should be viewed as a form of social ordering, as a way in which the relations 
of men to one another are governed and regulated. Even in the absence of any formalized 
doctrine of stare decisis or res judicata, an adjudicative determination will normally enter in 
some degree into the litigants' future relations and into the future relations of other parties 
who see themselves as possible litigants before the same tribunal. 
56. The doctrine of precedent in gene~al furthers both temporal stability and equality: 
This concern for equal treatment usually surfaces in discussions about the temporal stability 
of legal rules, because stare decisis promotes the equal treatment of individuals over time. 
But equal treatment in a spatial sense seems an equally compelling goal. ... [G]eographical 
variation in otherwise uniform rules caused by divergent judicial interpretations seems irra-
tional and unfair. 
Caminker. supra note 4, at 852. Geographic or intra-program variation would seem particularly repug-
nant in most administrative schemes. See generally Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacqui-
escence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 735-36 (1989). 
57. The evolution of agency law on a case-by-case basis creates a path dependency problem. Each 
move in an individual case may cut off more advantageous moves in the future. See ALPHA C. CHIANG, 
ELEMENTS OF DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION 5 (1992) ("This [example] serves to point out a very important 
fact: A myopic, one-stage-at-a-time optimization procedure will not in general yield the optimal path!"). 
The more adjudicators are held to past decisions, the less likely the system is to arrive at the optimum 
results when new needs are revealed in some future case. 
58. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 4, at 598 ("[T]he value of predictability is really a question of 
balancing expected gain against expected loss."). 
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decisionmaking environment willing to tolerate suboptimal results in order 
that people may plan their lives according to decisions previously made?"59 
A strong commitment to precedent would prevent agencies from re-
sponding to changing circumstances and new understandings. Agencies 
must be given the freedom to adjust to the real world and to learn from ex-
perience. The First Circuit expressed this well-established administrative 
law principle: "Experience is often the best teacher, and agencies retain a 
substantial measure of freedom to refine, reformulate, and even reverse their 
precedents in the light of new insights and changed circumstances."60 
Therefore, the system allows administrative adjudicators to weigh the need 
for dynamic policymaking against predictability and reliance values.61 
For these reasons, administrative law softens the formalism of stare de-
cisis, but it does not dismiss the values which support attention to precedent. 
While eschewing a strong doctrine of precedent, administrative law has 
adopted a balanced requirement of consistency which dictates that, in gen-
eral, like circumstances should be treated alike.62 That is, administrative law 
demands consistency in agency adjudicative decisions as in all other admin-
istrative decisions, but consistency attentive to the need for dynamic ad-
ministration. 
2. Superior Precedent 
Policies expressed by the agency head in prior opinions affect adjudica-
tive decisions throughout the adjudicative hierarchy. We can start to under-
59. !d. at 597. Kornhauser shows that this judgment is complicated by the tension between efficient 
outcomes during different time periods. Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare De-
cisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63, 89 (1989) ("In some contexts, therefore, a court will maximize social 
welfare by adhering to a legal rule that fails to maximize social welfare in the particular period."); see 
also Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. 
REv.93, 113 (1989) (conceding that this observation, while critical, "greatly has enriched our under-
standing of a complex legal phenomenon"). 
60. Davila-Bardales v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 27 F.3d I, 5 (1st Cir. 1994). But see 
Prof'l Airways Sys. Specialists v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 809 F.2d 855, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Fi-
delity to law requires more than mechanical incantations about the life and growth of the law."). 
61. This freedom is recognized in the principles of judicial review. Administrative policy decisions 
are reviewed for arbitrariness. Often this review takes the form of "hard look" review, where the review-
ing court assures that the agency took a hard look at the issues. The court would arrogate policymaking 
power if it took a hard look itself. For a further discussion, s~ 3 KOCH, supra note 2, § 12.31. In short, 
judicial review law facilitates policymaking by allowing the agencies great freedom. This freedom is not 
justified by the studies of skewed judicial decisionmaking used in Part III for insights into potential 
influences acting on the administrative judiciary, but rather by the understanding that agencies, nor 
courts, are assigned the task of, and are better able to make, policy decisions. The liberty review law 
provides the agencies with great scope and hence the quality and fairness of policy depends on the ad-
ministrative policymaking itself. Administrative adjudication must be examined as one of the vehicles of 
that policymaking. 
62. Henry v. INS, 74 F.3d I, 6 (1st Cir. 1996). 
[A]gencies do not have carte blanche. While a certain amount of asymmetry is lawful. an 
agency may not 'adopt[ ] significantly inconsistent policies .that result in the creation of con-
flicting lines of precedent governing the identical situation.' ... In other words, administra-
tive agencies must apply the same basic rules to all similarly situated supplicants. 
Id. (quoting Davila-Bardales v. INS, 27 F.3d I, 5 (1st Cir. 1994), and Williston Basin Int'l Pipeline Co. 
v. FERC, 165 F.3d 54,65 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). 
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stand the nature of the effect on administrative judges by looking closely at 
the general principles of hierarchical judicial control. Understanding the 
dynamics of administrative adjudication policy, as with judicial lawmaking, 
starts with understanding the nature and extent of the obedience generally 
required of lower-level adjudicators. Caminker provides us with an exten-
sive body of useful scholarship on the question of the lawmaking function 
of "inferior" courts.63 Although the "inferior" courts Caminker studies are 
those below the Supreme Court, his observations about the policymaking 
relationship offer insights useful for analyzing the administrative adjudica-
tive hierarchy. 
Caminker posits a nonhierarchical system in which courts at all levels 
have equal lawmaking authority.64 Interestingly, such a system is not merely 
hypothetical. As strange as such a system might feel to common-law law-
yers, Caminker notes the error in dismissing the system as implausible be-
cause the system apparently works in civil-law countries.65 Moreover, some 
administrative systems, especially in the states to be discussed in subpart 
V.A, are increasingly giving the administrative judges such autonomy. 
Carninker examines the possible gains accrued from disobedience by an 
inferior adjudicative authority, or "underruling." Disobedience may spur 
reform; indeed, some refusal to follow prior authority is a necessary element 
to reevaluation. Still, in the end, Caminker concludes that the benefits of 
disobedience are ambiguous, conceding that "one might identify discrete 
instances in which the benefits of forced rethinking likely outweigh the 
costs, but a flat prohibition of underruling might better balance benefits and 
costs over the entire range of cases."66 These observations support a cabined 
opportunity for experimentation and even disobedience at the administrative 
judge level.67 
63. Caminker, supra note 4, at 1515 (noting that levels of the judiciary "enjoy somewhat different 
packages of judicial power vis-a-vis each other, depending on their specific role and placement within 
the integrated and hierarchical Article ill system"). 
64. Caminker, supra note 4, at 826. 
I d. 
One can certainly imagine an institutional regime in this country in which district courts, 
courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court all behave as autonomous law-declaring actors .... 
[T]he non-precedent-based hierarchy would grant district courts great lawmaking power, sub-
ject only to case-by-case error correction by superior courts in a limited number of instances. 
65. It is legitimate to say that lower courts are not bound by higher court decisions as in the com-
mon-law systems, hence they may and do engage in "underruling." But, there is a difference between 
formality and practice here. As a leading comparative law text observes: 
A quick look round the Continent shows that matters are not really very different there. It is 
true that there is never any legal rule which compels a judge to follow the decisions of a 
higher court, but the reality is different. In practice a judge of the [French or German appel-
late court] today can count on being followed by lower courts just as much as a judgment of 
an appeal court in England or in the United States. 
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HE!N KOTZ, INTRODUCfiON TO COMPARATIVE LAW 262 (1998). 
66. Caminker, supra note 4, at 864-65. 
67. One study of judges found that more qualified judges "were significantly more likely to strike 
out from the mainstream and adopt marginal theories." Sisk et al., supra note 42, at 1481. In short, the 
better the judges, the more likely they are to venture to improve agency policy. It is likely that they will 
also make a real contribution in doing so. This finding suggests that the better administrative judges will 
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Administrative judges also have an interpretative function that gives 
them some opportunities with respect to precedent. Caminker posits two 
distinct uses an inferior adjudicative authority might make of precedent 
even if they felt generally obligated to apply prior decisions. Under a literal 
model, the lower courts make decisions according to their best understand-
ing of the current law of the superior court.68 Under Caminker's "proxy 
model," the lower court attempts to put itself in the place of the superior 
court and predict how that court would decide the case.69 Caminker found 
that "it is difficult to credit the claim that inferior courts obey superior court 
precedents because inferior courts must independently interpret the law and 
the precedents count as a part of that law-indeed, a part superior to other 
sources of written law."70 He suggests instead that "when there is a higher 
court precedent on point, lower courts do not themselves interpret and apply 
the law; rather, they apply the law as their superior court has interpreted 
it."71 Thus, an administrative judge, like a lower court, is using the prece-
dent rather than "obeying" it. The administrative judge is attempting to pre-
dict how the agency will decide the case rather than simply following prior 
decisions. Whether an inferior adjudicator should approach superior prece-
dent in this way is not clear: "[P]redictive behavior ought to be deemed a 
proper exercise of judicial power if it is consistent with the institutional 
values .... "72 Thus, the agency and its adjudicators might best interact on 
the issue. Carninker would not choose the predictive model unless it would 
"actually generate greater correspondence" within the adjudicative hierar-
chy.73 Carninker finds that obedience generally should be the norm, with 
some allowance for creative deviation. 
Obedience to the highest authority's decisions produces the economic 
results of fewer cases and efficient resolution of recurring issues. Schauer 
found, as a major justification relevant to administrative adjudications, that 
obedience conserves decisionmaking resources.74 Caminker tested the 
proposition that "the desire to reduce the inefficiencies a multitiered adjudi-
catory process generates justifies present doctrine."75 He found that 'judicial 
display exactly the kind of "disobedience" that will contribute to the policymaking enterprise. This not 
only confirms that we should seek the best administrative judges, but my study found that federal admin-
istrative judges (state judges were not studied) have fairly high qualifications. Charles Koch, Jr .. Admin-
istrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 290 (1994) ("The quality of the presiding 
officials as a group is impressive and there is little difference between the qualifications of AUs and AJs 
[judges with formal APA protection and those without]."). 
68. Caminker terms this model, somewhat confusingly, the "precedent" model, even though the two 
models both begin with the precedent. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-
Looking Aspect of inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEx. L. REv. I (1994). 
69. /d. at 16. 
70. !d. at 26. 
71. /d. at 27 (referring to this as the "subject-transfer" perspective). 
72. !d. at 31. 
73. /d. at 44. This finding depends on the data used to make the predictions. 
74. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 4, at 599. 
75. Caminker, supra note 4, at 839. 
708 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 56:3:693 
economy provides a strong rationale for a duty to obey hierarchical prece-
dent only in certain contexts."76 
The call for obedience in the administrative adjudicative context is 
heightened by the evolution of the administrative judge position. Shapiro 
observed that obedience to higher precedent in the administrative process 
should recognize the sub-delegation of authority from which the administra-
tive judges act.77 The adjudicative hierarchy, including the evolution of to-
day's administrative judges, began because the agency heads could not pre-
side at hearings themselves.78 Thus, administrative judges began as agents 
of the agency head and have retained this character despite evolving into a 
discrete institution. In this respect, they are quite distinct from the lower 
courts. Attention to the dictates of the higher authority, at least in policy 
matters, is compelled by administrative law's general allocation of authority 
as well as the aforementioned generalized benefits for sound adjudication.79 
The judicial approach to superior precedent has ramifications for the 
public at large. If judges do no more than apply the precedent as it exists, 
guidance information is available and concrete. The more judges stray from 
strict application and literal interpretation, the less confidence the public has 
in its understanding of agency policy. Hence, freeing the judges leaves the 
litigant and the public less sure of agency law. However, it also presents the 
public with an opportunity in the face of contrary law. The approach to su-
perior precedent then creates a continuum between certainty and clarity on 
the one hand and the opportunity, both for the agency and the litigants, for 
dynamism and tailoring to individual circumstances. 
Administrative law recognizes that a strong sense of precedent may af-
fect the system's ability to do individual justice. In his study of the massive 
Social Security Administration adjudications, Mashaw observed: 
Objectification of standards, the use of presumptions, the routiniza-
tion of evidentiary development, all tend to overgeneralize, to pi-
geonhole, to leave gaps. Rulemaking necessarily constrains sensi-
tive exercise of individualized discretion. This characteristic of 
76. /d. at 841. 
77. Sidney Shapiro. comments (on file with the author). 
78. FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
43 ( 1941) ('The heads of the agency cannot, through press of duties, sit to hear all the cases which must 
be decided."). 
79. This history explains to some extent why administrative appellate review is de novo. The federal 
APA codifies this tradition when it provides: "On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the 
agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision .... " 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) 
(2000); Janka v. Dep't of Transp., 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that Section 557(b) 
provides that the decision of a presiding officer does not become the decision of the agency if there is 
"an appeal to ... the agency" and that the agency may therefore conduct "plenary review of an AU's 
decision"). However, some administrative schemes, particularly in the states, impose more limited re-
view. Rossi, supra note 23, at 572. If such a scheme is limited to the administrative review authority's 
ability to "correct" findings of fact, the shift of burden can be justified. 
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clear decision rules, like vagueness, can introduce errors or skew 
them systematically and inappropriately in one direction.80 
In recognition of this dilemma, administrative law has adopted the view that 
wooden reliance on precedent may create unfairness and injustice if not 
tempered with individualizing discretion. 81 
While the judges should have some freedom then to adjust or even dis-
obey superior precedent, reasonably strong control by the administrative 
review authority is necessary to allow it to balance flexibility and growth of 
agency policy against consistency and equality.82 The opinions of higher 
adjudicative authorities have the benefit of analysis percolating through the 
adjudicative machinery with the lower-level adjudicators providing differ-
ing analyses and reaching different conclusions in individual cases.83 
Lower-level policy-related freedom requires the availability of administra-
tive review to assure against improper or incorrect policy determinations. 
Justice seems best served by a norm of obedience in which the lower-level 
adjudicators generally seek to obey agency policy expressed in superior 
precedent, and where an administrative review authority representing the 
agency as an institution is available to test that obedience but take advan-
tage of studied disobedience. 
So, in many ways, rather than engaging in the "correction" of the policy 
conclusions of administrative judges, the agency is capturing the benefits of 
different perspectives. The judges bring an individual and a "street-level" 
persEective, and the agency adds sensitivity to societal and cumulative val-
ues. The system acquires some balance when the administrative judges 
force the agency to justify cumulative objectives as against practical reality 
80. JERRY MASAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 
107 (1983) (emphasis added). 
81. Brehmer v. FAA, 294 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
I d. 
A "policy" is just that .... It indicates the standards an agency generally will follow in con-
ducting its operations. It is not, however, a black letter rule that the agency is required to fol-
low in all cases without regard to the circumstances of the particular situation before it. 
82. Administrative adjudicators, like courts, are likely to attempt to protect their policy choices. 
Studies demonstrate that judges formulate their actions so as to protect their policy preferences. Smith 
and Tiller delved into the strategies lower courts undertake to protect their policy choices. Joseph Smith 
& Emerson Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61 
(2002). Thus, they identify that "a key insight of the strategic instrument theory is that the policy choice 
of the court is reflected through a combination of the court's policy outcome and instrument selection, 
not through the policy outcome alone." Jd. at 68. Both the judge and the agency are likely to choose 
actions that protect their policy choices and somewhat confuse the pure policy issue. Avoiding the ques-
tion of whether the agency should act in such a way to protect its policy, its judges should not attempt 
through strategic behavior to limit the agency's policy choices. The judges' job, in fact, is to alert the 
agency to the policy issues first, and offer their own solution second. 
83. Caminker, supra note 4, at 860. Carninker concedes that some jurists and scholars are skeptical. 
/d. 
84. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941) ("Cabinet officers charged by Congress 
with adjudicatory functions are not assumed to be flabby creatures any more than judges are. Both may 
have an underlying philosophy in approaching a specific case."); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 
701 (1948). 
710 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 56:3:693 
and individual consequences. On the other hand, like trial judges, adminis-
trative judges are not held to the same level of external scrutiny.85 The re-
view stage serves the dual function of holding a judge responsible outside 
the hearing room and allowing for the open analysis of a judge's initiatives. 
Thus, a review authority must have the final say, but it should measure 
lower-level decisions against policy integrity, the potential for improve-
ments on the prior policy position, and valuable specificity in application.86 
However, the appeal and review process is necessarily fitful and reac-
tive, and hence often incapable of assuring either general policy integrity or 
optimum policy development.87 Although the opportunity for a superior 
tribunal to deal with a variety of lower-level approaches enhances the 
agency's policymaking, both as the ultimate adjudicative authority and in 
performing its other policymaking functions, the opportunity presented by 
review is not sufficient. More creative alternatives should supplement the 
appeal and review process in order to better capture these advantages. Such 
alternatives might include disciplining judges who fail to uphold policy 
integrity.88 Independence might be insured by a body comprised of other 
judges.89 More positive approaches to interaction on policy, such as confer-
85. See Mitu Gulati & CM.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 
188 (I 998) (noting that district court judges "sit alone and do not have the benefit of the intellectual 
debate among a panel"). 
86. Many administrative review authorities, but not all, are collegial as well. 
87. "In very broad terms, if the head of the agency remains relatively free to reverse the AU, the 
values of expertise and political accountability predominate. If the head of the agency is bound to defer 
substantially to the AU, the value of objectivity and its appearance are dominant." William R. Ander-
sen, Judicial Review of State Administrative Action-Designing the Statutory Framework, 44 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 523, 556 (1992). A controversy has persisted for generations as to the reliability or even existence 
of objective expertise in the administrative process. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2260-64 (2001). Justice Breyer urges a return to the concept of expertise, but this 
view continues to be contested. ld. at 2262-63 (citing STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS 
CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 61, 73-74 (1993)); Bruce Ackerman, The New Separa-
tion of Powers, 113 HARv. L. REv. 633, 697-715 (2000). Ackerman is described as "another prominent 
member of the new expertise movement." Kagan, supra, at 2262 n.52. 
88. Koplow and I studied the Social Security administrative review authority, the "Appeals Coun-
cil." We found that in mass justice programs particularly, the traditional appellate review apparatus was 
insufficient to assure "policy integrity." More aggressive measures, such as sampling cases involving 
target areas, was necessary-at least in an administrative adjudicative system that handles a massive 
caseload-both to assure consistency and to alJow the agency to come to grips with complex questions 
raised within the expanse of SSA adjudications. Charles Koch, Jr. & David Koplow, The Fourth Bite at 
the Apple: A Study of the Operation and Urility of the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council, 
17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 199,279 (1990). 
89. Consistent disobedience creates gaps which do not contribute to policy evolution, but can only 
be considered capricious and hence might justify disciplinary or training-type approaches. Stephens v. 
Merit System Personnel Bd., 986 F.2d 493, 498 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding that decisional independence 
does not prevent an agency from requiring additional training as a disciplinary device). Members of the 
conventional judiciary face administrative discipline for failing to faithfuiJy apply the law, and adminis-
trative judges should also face some discipline for failures regarding agency law. Steven Lubet, a judicial 
ethics expert, describes as unacceptable instances in which "[s]ome judges have demonstrated utter 
ignorance of the Jaw, or sheer disregard for it, some going so far as to decide cases on the basis of 'coin 
flips."' Steven Lubet, Judicial Discipline and Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 59, 72 
(1998). Under such circumstances, disciplinary machinery is necessary to assure accountability. Lubet 
identified four compelling circumstances justifying disciplinary action based on legal misconduct: (1) a 
pattern of repeated and uncorrected legal error; (2) errors exceeding some "egregiousness quotient," 
including "[a] willful refusal to follow the law, as distinct from an honest and acknowledged difference 
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ences and training sessions, might be considered.90 The experience and 
views of judges might be sought in the context of rulemaking. 
3. Horizontal Precedent 
In addition to careful, but flexible, attention to opinions from the supe-
rior authority as a way to optimize the policymaking role of the administra-
tive judge, a judge also contributes by providing opinions for colleagues.91 
"Horizontal" precedent, the impact of prior decisions by other administra-
tive judges, raises another category of questions. As previously discussed, 
the agency adjudicators are not bound by prior opinions.92 Similar to an 
equity court, the administrative judge seeks to provide individual justice. 
Although the decisions of a higher adjudicative authority may represent 
agency law that a judge cannot ignore, the opinions of comparable judges 
have no formal authority. However, to further the goals of consistency and 
informed decisionmaking, judges must not ignore the work of their col-
leagues. Schauer observed that precedent equalizing dissimilar decision-
makers-that is, honest disagreement among judges-while beneficial to 
the reformation of a body of law, can create inconsistencies incompatible 
with the fair resolution of individual cases.93 Administrative judges should 
of opinion or interpretation, may manifest unfitness for judicial office"; (3) legal errors which cannot be 
corrected on appeal; and ( 4) decisions constituting a "complete abdication of the judicial function." /d. at 
72-74. The key is curing these consistent breakdowns in accountability without compromising independ-
ence. ld. at 65 ("Accountability and independence are not mutually exclusive; most often, we can have 
both."). 
90. Something like this was attempted in the Social Security Adntinistration. 'The SSAB [Social 
Security Advisory Board] was created as an oversight body when the SSA became an independent 
agency in March of 1995. But the SSAB, though effective at the conceptual level, is not in a position to 
carry out actual management reforms." Verkuil, supra note 1, at 729. As discussed below, many states 
have constituted independent offices which supply adntinistrative judges to various agencies. Under the 
Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency, the chief judge may monitor the quality of the 
judges' performance. Christopher McNeil, The Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency: 
Promises, Practical Problems, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 475, 498-500 (2001). A 
long time chief AU disagrees with the idea that chief judges should have the power to impose uniform 
law or policy. John W. Hardwicke, The Central Panel Movement: A Work in Progress, 53 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 419, 440 (2001). 
91. Judge John Hardwicke, long time chief Administrative Law Judge for Maryland, expressed 
concern over this possibility. He suggested that conversations between the judges and the agency head 
were too dangerous and should not be permitted: "Never, never should a judge discuss on-going litiga-
tion with an outsider, including especially the agency or any other executive functionary." John Hard-
wicke, comments (on file with author). Nonetheless, he approved of panel discussions involving judges, 
government attorneys, members of the bar, and the general public. The failure to include the agency 
loses some of the advantage both for the judges and the agency, hence those representing the agency 
ntight be included with considerable thought to safeguards. 
92. The APA seems to require an opinion. APA, supra note 11, § 557(c). 
93. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 4, at 600. A study of the federal adntinistrative judiciary con-
eluded: 
The potential for interdecisional inconsistency increases with increases in the number of in-
dependent adjudicatory officers, increases in the difficulty of the disputes they resolve, and 
increases in the degree of subjective or normative judgment required to resolve the disputes. 
The potential for significant interdecisional inconsistency is a major concern because it vio-
lates a cardinal principle of our system of justice-like cases should be resolved in like man-
ner. 
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conform to prior decisions, even those they disagree with, in order to assure 
an even-handed process.94 More specifically, an administrative system must 
strike a balance between equal treatment and individualizing discretion, and 
individual programs might weigh these two values differently in requiring 
consistency among judges. 
However, a strong sense of horizontal precedent may be unfair to those 
affected by the agency's programs, especially in mass justice programs. The 
sheer burden of collecting related cases renders horizontal precedent im-
practical for society's disadvantaged and their overstretched representa-
tives.95 Indeed, this unfairness is a driving force behind administrative law's 
preference for rules. In short, horizontal precedent is often inappropriate for 
a particular administrative program. While administrative judges should 
share knowledge and experience in handling individual cases, true authority 
should not be given to a colleague's prior treatment of cases in most adjudi-
cative settings.96 
4. Conclusion 
Practical as well as normative factors counsel in favor of obedience to 
the decisions of a higher administrative authority. This obedience may be 
tempered by the need to render individual justice, and under proper circum-
stances, the need to begin the adjustment of existing agency law. However, 
horizontal precedent should be given little weight. Administrative judges 
may be influenced by the wisdom of their colleagues, but they should not 
feel any formal compulsion to follow their lead.97 Regardless, the policy 
role of administrative judges determines the nature of adjudicative policy-
making in each program. Each agency should be conscious of this role and 
incorporate it in to their policymaking arsenal.98 In the end, the agency is 
VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 40, at 139. 
94. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 4, at 588 ("The most obvious consequence, of course, is that a 
decisionmaker constrained by precedent will sometimes feel compelled to make a decision contrary to 
the one she would have made had there been no precedent to be followed."). 
95. Gifford, supra note 41, at 997 ("In a mass-justice agency, adjudication is unsuited for use as a 
vehicle for announcing or formulating policy. The cases come too fast and in too great a volume for 
decisionmakers to look to other cases as guides .... "). 
96. Agencies should facilitate judges' ability to share their views and experiences in other forms and 
forums. Conferences and training are obvious ways to accomplish this. Judges might also be encouraged 
to consult on individual cases. However, to the extent it applies to administrative judges, the ABA 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct allows judges to consult with court personnel and other judges only for 
emergency and administrative purposes. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUcr Canon 3(c) cmt. [5] 
(2003) [hereinafter ABA CODE]. 
97. It is only those cases in which the judges show careful attention to the broader impact of their 
decision that other judges should consider the effect as something similar to precedent. On the other 
hand, the potential for future impact may distract hearing-level judges from their primary duty of decid-
ing individual disputes. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 4, at 588. One study suggests that courts may 
decide not to publish opinions for fear that the opinions will create bad precedent. See generally Gulati 
& McCauliff, supra note 85. 
98. The agency might also consider what support is available to administrative judges making these 
policy-related decisions. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct, to the extent it applies to administrative 
judges, provides a very narrow concession to consultation with legal experts. ABA CODE, supra note 96, 
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best situated to appraise the contribution an administrative judge may make 
to its policymaking. 
B. Incorporating Agency Rules into Adjudicative Decisions 
Administrative judges primarily rely on rules and general policy pro-
nouncements for a general policy framework because most of an agency's 
policy is embodied in rules and general policy pronouncements rather than 
caselaw.99 The agency head promulgates rules, and administrative law doc-
trine compels the agency to obey the rules or justify its disobedience. 
Throughout the hierarchy, agency adjudicators-including administrative 
judges-are required to apply rules and policy pronouncements. Thus, the 
melding of rules and other policy pronouncements into individual adjudica-
tive decisions raises complex questions regarding the allocation of authority 
within the administrative structure. Often administrative judges' treatment 
of policy pronouncements creates great tension within a program's admini-
stration. A close look at the proper role of these pronouncements in a pro-
gram's adjudication is needed. Additionally, this Article will consider the 
possible contribution of administrative judges to the quality of an agency's 
general policy pronouncements. 
An agency must obey its own rules in order further the goal of consis-
tency.100 The basic doctrine for this requirement is derived from three "red 
at Canon 3B(7)(b) ("A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law ... if the judge 
gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the parties 
reasonable opportunity to respond."). Consultation with experts in order to contribute to administrative 
policy, or "agency law," might be considered the equivalent of courts seeking legal expertise. However, 
this administrative law adaptation can be questioned. It might be consistent with the spirit of this provi-
sion for an administrative judge to consult a legal expert on theinterpretation of agency policy, either in 
rules or precedent. /d. at cmt. 10 ( '"Law' denotes court rules as well as statutes, constitutional provi-
sions and decisional law."). But, it may stretch the spirit of this freedom too far to allow a judge to 
consult on the wisdom or modification of agency policy. In addition, the APA prohibition against ex 
parte communication may be an impediment. APA, supra note II,§ 557(d); see also 81 MSAPA, supra 
note 36, § 4-213 (regarding the states). Arguably this provision, however, might leave room for consulta-
tion with special experts who have no stake in the outcome, and it might be read to require only that such 
consultations be noticed. To some extent, the law is more generous when it comes to consultation with 
agency staff not involved in the adjudication. White v. Indiana Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 766 (7th Cir. 
200 I) ("[N]on-record discussions between an agency's decision makers and members of the agency's 
staff are common and proper."); see Greenberg v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 968 F.2d 
164, 167 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that separation of function standards are lower for administrative judges 
than federal judges). If an agency wants to optimize the policy contribution of its judges, it might work 
out some principled opportunity for them to consult. Formal guidelines and instructions may serve to 
legitimize support. 
99. ''[nhere is rulemaking, which has in the [1970s] replaced adjudication as the central mechanism 
of agency law giving." Scalia, supra note 42, at 72. 
100. A.D. Transp. Express, Inc. v. United States, 290 F.3d 761, 766 (6th Cir. 2002) ("When an 
agency promulgates regulations it is ... bound by those regulations."); Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F. 3d 
633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ('The Accardi doctrine requires federal agencies to follow their own rules, 
even gratuitous procedural rules that limit otherwise discretionary actions."); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. 
Dole, 828 F.2d 799, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (recognizing "the principle that a court will require an agency 
to follow the legal standards contained in its own regulations despite the fact that a statute has granted 
the agency discretion in the matter"). This is the law in the states as well. E.g., State Bd. of Tax 
Comm'rs v. Indianapolis Racquet Club, Inc., 743 N.E.2d 247, 251-52 (Ind. 2001); Hudson v. Dep't of 
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baiting" cases. The frrst and most influential, United States ex ret. Accardi 
v. Shaughnessy, 101 involved efforts by the Attorney General to deport "un-
savory characters." The petitioner applied for suspension of deportation, 
which according to INS rules, should have been decided by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals. The rule required the Board to exercise its discretion, 
and the Attorney General's efforts to avoid INS rules were found by the 
Court to be impermissible. Accardi was followed by two similar cases 
firmly estab I i shing these general principles. 102 
Though the doctrine is well-established, it is not inflexible. Equally 
well-established is the proviso that an agency may deviate from its rules for 
good cause. 103 Administrative judges face a duty to be faithful to the 
agency's policy decisions, and this duty strengthens the need to obey the 
agency's rules and policy pronouncements. Additionally, a judge's failure to 
obey an agency policy reflects poorly on the agency-the judge's violation 
is the agency's violation. However, a judge may be in the best position to 
see reasons for an individual or even a general modification of an agency 
rule. Thus, an administrative judge should have flexibility to deviate from 
an established policy as long as the judge can adequately justify the devia-
tion. However, because it is the agency who will ultimately be held ac-
countable, the agency must make the final decision regarding a deviation or 
change. 
The question of application is complicated because administrative rules 
may have differing force and administrative adjudicators may be bound in 
differing ways. Legislative rules are promulgated pursuant to delegated au-
thority through public procedures and consequently carry the force of 
law. 104 Since policy pronouncements acquire the force of law, an agency 
may have a special duty to follow its own legislative rules unless it ex-
Corr., 703 A.2d 268, 273 (N.J. 1997) ("[A]n administrative agency ordinarily must enforce and adhere 
to, and may not disregard, the regulations it has promulgated."). 
101. United States ex rei. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). 
102. In Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957), the Supreme Court found that the discharge of a 
foreign service officer for disloyalty violated regulations of the State Depanment. ld. at 388. Similarly, 
the Court in Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959), reinstated an Interior Depanment employee who 
had been charged with "sympathetic association" with communists in violation of the Depanment's own 
regulations. ld. at 537. 
103. The Court in United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979), established the principle that an 
agency does not violate due process when it fails to follow its own rules./d. at 741-42. Joshua Schwartz 
observed: 
Accardi contains a passing ambiguous reference that might suggest a due process foundation 
for agencies' obligation to follow their own regulations. But the overall tenor of the opinion 
suggests that the Court considered this obligation a necessary consequence of the regulations' 
status as law binding on private parties. 
Joshua I. Schwanz. The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object: Estoppel Remedies for an 
Agency's Violation of Its Own Regulation or Other Misconduct., 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 653,671 (1992). 
104. The foundational case is Caceres, in which the Court accepted the agency's assertion that fol-
lowing the rule would have interfered with a criminal investigation. 440 U.S. at 752-54; see also Revak 
v. Nat'l Mines Corp., 808 F.2d 996, 1002 n.IO (3d Cir. 1986); Shell Oil Co. v. FERC, 664 F.2d 79, 83 
(5th Cir. 1981) ("In certain instances, no doubt, FERC may exercise its equitable discretion and stray 
from the use of its general regulations. In order to do so, however, FERC must articulate valid reasons 
for the departure."). 
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presses a strong reason justifying disobedience. 105 Therefore, these rules 
bind agency adjudicators until the rule is amended or revoked. 106 
Such policy pronouncements are distinct from policy statements which 
do not purport to be made from delegated authority and consequently do not 
carry the force oflaw.107 Though several terms can be used to describe these 
pronouncements, this Article will collectively call them "nonlegislative" 
rules. 108 Nonlegislative rules are a categorically different type of pro-
nouncement from legislative rules, and this difference should be reflected in 
the weight given by an agency's adjudicators. 109 A nonlegislative rule is a 
device for announcing policy. 110 They are intended to disclose the agency's 
views and offer guidance regarding agency law. 111 Thus, an agency must 
105. E.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) ("Such 
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute."); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 296 (1979); O'Sullivan v. Country-
wide Home Loan, Inc., 319 F.3d 732, 740 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Where ... agency regulations are promul-
gated under express congressional authority, they are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.") (quoting Chevron, 476 U.S. at 844). 
106. Clean Ocean Action v. York, 57 F.3d 328, 333 (3d Cir. 1995); Cmty. Action, Inc. v. Bowen, 866 
F.2d 34 7, 352 (lOth Cir. 1989). 
107. An agency may change its rules. Voyageurs Region Nat') Park Ass'n v. Lujan, 966 F.2d 424, 
428 (8th Cir. 1992); Romeiro De Silva v. Smith, 773 F.2d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 1985) ("An agency is 
bound by its regulations so long as they remain operative, but may repeal them and substitute new rules 
in their place."); see also Macey, supra note 59, at 97 (responding to Kornhauser's observations about 
the tension between efficient outcomes in different time periods by noting that the legislature may 
change inefficient legal rules). 
108. E.g., Farrell v Dep't of Interior, 314 F.3d 584, 590 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (concluding after a survey of 
authority that "[t]he general consensus is that an agency statement, not issued as a formal regulation, 
binds the agency only if the agency intended the statement to be binding"). 
109. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Public Procedures for the Promulgation of Interpretative Rules and Gen-
eral Statements of Policy, 64 GEO. L.J. 1047, 1048 (1976); see also Michael Asimow, Public Participa-
tion in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements, 15 MICH. L. REv. 520 (1977). 
110. E.g., Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. FERC, 315 F.3d 316, 323 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
ld. 
"Policy statements" differ from substantive rules that carry the "force of law," because they 
lack "present binding effect" on the agency. When an agency hears a case under an estab-
lished policy statement, it may decide the case using that policy statement if the decision is 
not otherwise arbitrary and capricious. 
Ill. One brand of nonlegislative rule, "statements of policy," may not have a binding effect on the 
agency, resulting in even more ambiguous application to administrative judges. Several couns distin-
guish statements of policy from other nonlegislative rules because the latter are not "binding norms" 
which control the agency. For example, the D.C. Circuit described a statement of policy in these terms: 
An agency policy statement does not seek to impose or elaborate or interpret a legal norm. It 
merely represents an agency position with respect to how it will treat-typically enforce-the 
governing legal norm. By issuing a policy statement, an agency simply lets the public know 
its current enforcement or adjudicatory approach .... [P]olicy statements are binding on nei-
ther the public, nor the agency. 
Syncor lnt'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
A statement might not be binding because it serves the dual purpose of "informing the public of 
the agency's future plans and priorities for exercising its discretionary power," as well as educating and 
providing direction to agency personnel who are required to implement the agency's policies and exer-
cise its discretionary powers in specific cases. Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 
1987). A statement acts only prospectively and it does not establish a "binding norm." Id. at 1014. None-
theless, even a statement may confine the agency's discretion where it would be unfair to deny the 
statement some effect. Ronald Levin urges that statements and interpretative rules have vinually the 
same effect. Ronald M. Levin, Nonlegislative Rules and the Administrative Open Mind, 41 DUKE L.J. 
1497, 1503 (1992). 
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obey these pronouncements as well as legislative rules unless a deviation 
can be justified.112 
However, an administrative judge may have considerably more freedom 
regarding those policy pronouncements that are not legislative rules. 113 In 
Morton v. Ruiz, 114 the Supreme Court held that an agency should not feel 
bound by its nonlegislative rules in the face of overriding considerations. lis 
Ruiz applied for assistance from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and 
was denied assistance because of a provision in the BIA manual limiting 
eligibility to Indians living "on reservations." Ruiz and his wife left the res-
ervation to live in an Indian community a short distance from the reserva-
tion and applied for assistance during a prolonged labor strike. The Court 
found that the manual was not binding on the agency because it was not a 
legislative rule. 116 The Court held that the agency should not follow the 
nonlegislati ve rule where the result would be unfair. 117 
This doctrine's real impact may be felt only in situations where the ad-
ministrative judge has some freedom in application. Thus, the impact of 
nonlegislative rules and policy pronouncements on administrative judges 
becomes complicated. An administrative judge should not apply a nonlegis-
lative rule if its application would be unfair. Hence, a judge may not be 
technically bound by an agency policy pronouncement that is not made pur-
suant to a delegated authority-meaning they may be bound only to legisla-
tive rules. 118 One example involved a seventeen-year-old woman with brain 
damage who was able to remain at home with extensive nursing help. The 
agency sought to downgrade the level of home nursing help, relying on a 
North Carolina Medicaid manual. The administrative judge , reviewing the 
change in status, found that the manual's list of criteria for justifying the 
enhanced service was not exhaustive, and ruled for the claimant.119 Logi-
I 12. Michael Asimow, Guidance Documents in the States: Toward a Safe Harbor, 54 ADMIN. L 
REV. 631, 632 (2002). 
/d. 
Virtually every administrative agency produces guidance documents expressing its view 
about the meaning of language in statutes and regulations .... Guidance documents of gen· 
era! applicability are enormously important to members of the public who seek to plan their 
affairs to stay out of trouble and minimize transaction costs. 
I I 3. Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F. 3d 633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ('The Accardi doctrine requires federal 
agencies to follow their own rules, even gratuitous procedural rules that limit otherwise discretionary 
actions."); Lake Mohave Boat Owners v. Nat'! Park Service, 138 F.3d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1998). 
114. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). 
115. /d. at 232. 
116. E.g., Td. at 233-35; United States v. Alameda Gateway Ltd., 213 F.3d 1161, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 
2000) (finding that a litigant could not rely on a regulation because it was not intended to be binding but 
to act as guidance); Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 82 (1st Cir. 1998). 
I I 7. Monon, 415 U.S. at 233-35. 
118. See Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect 
for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803 (2001) (arguing generally that "publication rules," 
though lacking the force of law, are important to the system, and so judges should not discourage reli-
ance upon them). 
119. Roberts v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 02 DHR 1138, 2003 WL 21638171 
(N.C.O.A.H. Apr. 25, 2003). 
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cally the Ruiz doctrine begins at the hearing-level in order to facilitate the 
exercise of individual discretion in decisionmaking. 
However, it is the extent of the judge's discretion that presents the real 
question. For years, courts have been bound by "Skidmore deference" when 
reviewing the application of nonlegislative rules. 120 This dictates that a 
court, while not bound to the rule, may find that the nonlegislative rule has 
the "power to persuade."121 Under Ruiz, if the agency has a duty not to in-
flexibly apply a nonlegislative rule, then perhaps administrative judges are 
justified in following a nonlegislative rule only to the extent they find the 
rule persuasive. While they are not authorized to change nonlegislative 
rules, they may adjust policy pronouncements under certain circumstances. 
Moreover, rules rarely answer all the questions raised in an adjudica-
tion, and administrative judges often have no choice but to engage in inter-
pretation of various types of policy pronouncements-both legislative and 
nonlegislative. The agency has considerable interpretive discretion, and it is 
well-established that an agency has broad authority to interpret its own 
rules. 122 Since the agency is conceded such broad authority to interpret rules 
120. The classic statement: 
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, 
while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of ex-
perience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guid-
ance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness 
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control. 
Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). The Court has consistently referred to this formulation. 
E.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237-38 (2001) (finding that an agency's ruling may be 
merely persuasive); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) (refusing to apply the EEOC 
guidelines). 
121. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
122. The classic authority for this proposition is Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 
413-14 (1945) (stating that "[s]ince this involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation a court 
must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words 
used is in doubt"), but the most cited case is Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. I. 16 (1965) (dealing with 
agency interpretations in general). The Supreme Court continually reaffirms this long-standing approach. 
E.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) ("[A]n agency's interpretation of its own 
regulation is entitled to deference."); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 356 (2000); Auer v. 
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,463 (1997); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36,44 (1993); Arkansas v. Okla-
homa, 503 U.S. 91, 112 (1992); Manin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 
144, 151 (1991). 
Because applying an agency's regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls upon 
the agency's unique expenise and policymaking prerogatives, we presume that the power au-
thoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the agency's delegated law-
making powers. 
Jd. In Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415 (1988), the court stated: 
[W]hen it is the Secretary's regulation that we are construing, and when there is no claim in 
this Court that the regulation violates any constitutional or statutory mandate, we are properly 
hesitant to substitute an alternative reading for the Secretary's unless that alternative reading 
is compelled by the regulation's plain language or by other indications of the Secretary's in-
tent at the time of the regulation's promulgation. 
Id. at 430; see also Mullins Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 159 
(1987). The lower courts also often express this doctrine. E.g., Wells Fargo Bank of Texas NA v. James, 
321 F.3d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that "where ... the regulation is ambiguous as to the precise 
issue in contest, an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is controlling unless it is clearly errone-
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and policy pronouncements, and even to engage in justified deviation, it 
follows that the agency's administrative judges may also do so-but care-
fully.123 Like superior precedent, judges might interpret rules in order to 
develop agency policy. 124 Policy change must percolate up through the 
process, and hence each level has a role in sharpening the rule through in-
terpretation. A judge's interpretation provides experience, which the rule 
and its policy will use to develop. Judges' interpretations additionally pro-
vide perspective on the policy's application, giving the agency "samples" 
for use in evolving future policy. Adjustments within the terms of the rule 
neither challenge the agency's authority nor unduly upset stability and 
equality. While judges may pay close attention to the language and clear 
meaning of a rule, a potential policymaking contribution exists when judges 
look behind the rule to conclude that strict application of the rule would not 
further its purpose in the individual case before them. That is, rather than 
literal strategies of interpretation, the judge may attempt to apply the rule as 
the agency would interpret the rule in that particular context. 
However, in both interpretation and application, a judge should be 
mindful of the effect policy pronouncements have on the public. Regardless 
of the policy pronouncement's formal effect, a member of the public to 
which the policy applies would be ill-advised to ignore it; hence the pro-
nouncement creates a variety of agency law. 125 The public relies on all 
forms of policy expression (if they recognize any difference), hence admin-
istrative judges should feel some pressure to follow a pronouncement's lan-
guage. Where a person relies on a rule, a judge should follow the rule be-
cause a court will hold the agency to the rule. Even where an individual did 
not detrimentally rely on the rule, the administrative judge should under-
stand that the general public looked to the rule for guidance. For a judge to 
take undue liberties with the language of policy statements, regardless of a 
ous"); Clark Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 314 F.3d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 2002) 
("Under the APA, an agency's interpretation of a regulation must be given controlling weight unless it is 
'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."') (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 
512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)). But see Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588 ("Auer deference is warranted only 
when the language of the regulation is ambiguous .... To defer to the agency's position would be to 
permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation."); 
Moore v. Hannon Food Serv., Inc., 317 F.3d 489, 494-96 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding the requirement that 
the rule be ambiguous was shared among the circuits, the court refused to give deference to the agency's 
interpretation of clear language). 
123. Interpretation may not constitute amendment or repeal, so even the agency head may not use 
interpretation in an adjudication because a rule must be amended or repealed by the same procedure with 
which it was promulgated. I KOCH, supra note 2, § 4.60[2]. If the need for amendment is identified in 
adjudication, or if the interpretation cannot make the necessary adjustment without constituting an 
amendment, then the adjudicators must commend the issue to the policymaking processes of the agency. 
124. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 96 (1995) (stating that "[t]he APA does not 
require that all the specific applications of a rule evolve by further, more precise rules rather than by 
adjudication"). 
125. Anthony has done the most to develop this argument. Recently, he addressed circumstances 
under which government guidance documents, advisories, opinion letters, bulletins, inspection manuals, 
and press releases effectively bind persons outside the agency in a practical, as opposed to legal, sense. 
Robert A. Anthony, Three Settings in Which Nonlegislative Rules Should Not Bind, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 
1313 (2001). 
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particular individual's detriment in relying on the rule, seemingly disadvan-
tages those covered by the particular administrative program. Thus, consid-
erations of fairness counsel an administrative judge generally to give effect 
to both nonlegislative and legislative rules. 
Like superior precedent, affording judges policy discretion regarding 
agency rules demands strong agency review to reassert the value of consis-
tency, the authority of the agency over policy, and any process values com-
promised by straying from the rule as promulgated. A system balancing 
flexibility and stability requires the placement of ultimate authority in the 
agency. Each individual administrative program may strike the appropriate 
balance differently, determining the appropriate attitude for the agency's 
judges to take towards agency rules and policy pronouncements. Policy-
making should be seen as a coordinated effort in which the judge's individ-
ual decisions contribute to policy development rather than an adversarial 
process in which the judge struggles against the agency's policymaking 
efforts. 
To further this cooperative effort, an agency may consider taking ad-
vantage of judges' experiences and perspectives when developing agency 
rules. While ethical rules seemingly prohibit such participation, the com-
mentary to the Judicial Code observes that "a judge is in a unique position 
to contribute to the improvement of the law, the legal system, and the ad-
ministration of justice .... To the extent that time permits, a judge is en-
couraged to do so .... "126 Judicial participation in administrative policy-
making offers the same benefits discussed in the Code, indeed administra-
tive judges have even more to contribute as active participants in adminis-
trative policymaking. However, the canon contains the hortatory phrase 
"subject to the requirements of this Code."127 The commentary notes, "This 
phrase is included to remind judges that the use of permissive language in 
various Sections of the Code does not relieve a judge from the other re-
quirements of the Code that apply to the specific conduct."128 
Attention to structuring judicial participation in agency policymaking is 
important to tapping this valuable resource and assuring that it falls within 
the appropriate range of judicial-type activities. For example, an agency 
may encourage judges to identify troublesome issues and recommendations 
as to possible resolutions. 129 Agencies with large numbers of administrative 
126. ABA CODE, supra note 96, at Canon 4B, cmt. [1]. 
127. !d. at Canon 4B. 
128. !d. at cmt. [2]. 
129. In order to take advantage of the expertise of judges in those systems, the French have regular-
ized the submission by the courts of recommendations for legislation. One scholar observed: 
[T]he Court of Cassation [the highest general law court] was very well placed to assess and 
comment upon the shortcomings of laws it applies on a day-to-day basis, notably spotting 
conflicting or outdated texts, and texts whose strict application may lead to injustice. The ju-
diciary ... being involved in the shaping of the law through its case law, could only have a 
positive influence on the process of law reform if someone were to take the trouble to listen 
to what it had to say. In fact ... the best way to reform the law in practical terms was through 
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judges (or in independent corps systems described below), might create an 
advisory committee of judges.130 As long as these contributions are open 
and made publicly available, they are not objectionable. In short, adminis-
trative adjudicators can provide a valuable resource to agencies formulating 
rules and policy. 
ill. APPROPRIATE CONSlDERATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE 
JUDGE POUCY ANALYSIS 
Recognizing and advocating a role for administrative judges in adminis-
trative policymaking requires a careful inquiry into the norms for their pol-
icy judgments. Administrative judges are, and should be, active participants 
in the administrative policymaking function. However, if administrative 
judges are delegated this responsibility, and freed from the mere application 
of the agency's policy expression, they must be conscious of the forces 
likely to operate on their policy choices. 
Administrative judges facing a policy issue must be consciously aware 
of the perceptual influences likely to affect their decisions. Guthrie, 
Rachlinski, and Wistrich applied the findings of one study, which identified 
certain honest "cognitive" distortions, to measure the impact of cognitive 
biases on judicial judgment. 131 They noted: "Psychologists have learned that 
human beings rely on mental shortcuts, which psychologists often refer to 
as 'heuristics,' to make complex decisions. Reliance on these heuristics 
facilitates good judgment most of the time, but it can also produce system-
atic errors in judgment."132 These commentators demonstrate that judges are 
vulnerable to cognitive illusions generated by heuristics. 133 For example, 
the joint efforts of judges and legislators acting in partnership, something ... that the annual 
report of the Court was trying to achieve. 
EVA STEINER, FRENCH LEGAL METHOD 115-16 (2002). 
130. The conventional judiciary is a regular participant in the legislative process. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court in the classic separation of powers case, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1988), 
seemed to accept the employment of judges in rulemaking. The Court held that neither the Commis-
sion's placement in the judiciary or the requirement that some federal judges serve as commissioners 
violated separation of powers. !d. at 412. Surely, if these members of the judiciary may participate in, 
and indeed form the heart of, a rulemaking agency, there can be neither legal impediment nor ethical 
objection to the administrative judiciary doing likewise. 
131. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L REv. 777, 825 (2001 ). 
132. /d. at 780. But see Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive l..LJafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review 
of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 486, 509 ( 2002) (arguing that appellate courts, unlike trial 
courts and many administrative adjudicators, have self-correcting mechanisms for these errors). Social 
psychology research has demonstrated that a conscious, rational mental process does not always lead to a 
better decision. See generally SUSAN FISKE & SHELLY T A YWR, SOCIAL COGNITION 399-402 (2d ed. 
1991). One recent study is particularly interesting. See Timothy Wilson & Jonathan Schooler, Thinking 
Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of Preference & Decisions, 60 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 181 ( 1991 ). The researchers evaluated certain types of choices in terms of the subjects' satis-
faction and found that ''rational" decisionmaking produced inferior choices in terms of the subjective 
preferences of those subjects. ld. at 190. One reported study, evaluating student course selection, sug-
gested that some choices might be objectively inferior as welL That study found that the "rational" 
choices were inferior to the "intuitive" choices when measured against the opinions of the faculty and 
the recommendations of students who had previously taken the course. ld. 
133. Guthrie et al., supra note 131, at 782. 
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measuring the effect of "framing," the categorization of decisions according 
to salient reference points, they found that framing "influenced the devel-
opment of legal doctrine."134 Along with the other heuristics, one would 
expect this heuristic could have some effect--even a considerable effect-
on policy judgments by administrative adjudicators. The commentators' 
suggested remedies thus become particularly relevant. They advise: "Only if 
increased attention and greater deliberation enable judges to abandon the 
heuristics that they are otherwise inclined to rely upon can they avoid the 
illusions of judgment that these heuristics produce."135 This supports the 
conclusion that the best cure for these "errors," perhaps particularly in pol-
icy judpents, is conscious attention to these potential decisionmaking 
flaws. 13 
Experience and anecdotal evidence suggest that judges of all varieties 
are not immune from personal motivations. As policymakers, administrative 
judges must also confront the danger of being ruled by their individual bi-
ases. Policy preferences in general have long been accepted, and to some 
extent encouraged, in both conventional and administrative adjudicators. 137 
While administrative judges may demonstrate and express such biases, the 
system cannot allow these personal biases to rule administrative policy. 
Consequently, if administrative judges are to have a policymaking role, they 
must be careful to examine the motivations behind their policy choices. 
Additionally, the administrative review authority should recognize these 
biases and assure they are consistent with the administrative program. 138 
Administrative judges should also be conscious of the way life experi-
ences affect their judgment. 139 For example, Sisk, Heise, and Morriss meas-
134. !d. at 798. 
135. !d. at 784. They investigate anchoring (making estimates based on irrelevant starting points), 
framing (treating economically equivalent gains and losses differently), hindsight bias (perceiving past 
events to have been more predictable than they actually were), the representativeness heuristic (ignoring 
important background statistical information in favor of individuating information), and egocentric 
biases (overestimating one's own abilities). !d. 
136. /d. at 819. 
137. For example, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal 
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549,554 (2002), noting: 
A key lesson of cognitive psychology is that even people with good motives tend to make bad 
choices in certain, predictable circumstances. Identifying those circumstances is at least as 
significant to diagnosing public policy failures as is focusing on the motives of key regulatory 
actors. 
!d. But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 
1165, 1168 (2003) (noting that restructuring decisions to avoid misleading heuristics means that "[t]his 
cognitive cost, like a transaction cost, might support adopting a particular legal rule constraining indi-
vidual choice if the cost is high enough or an inexpensive reform reduces the cognitive cost in some 
way"). 
138. Judge Hardwicke, the dean of panel judges, summarized: 
It would be highly improper for an administrative judge to color any decision with the AU's 
personal outlook or subjective viewpoint. However, intuition and instinct are reasonable, 
even necessary, for the ALJ insofar as they relate to the overarching mission of the agency on 
the one hand, and to requisite uncompromising fairness and impartiality for the citizen on the 
other. 
Hardwicke, supra note 90, at 439. 
139. It is unclear how susceptible judges, in general, are to more personal motivations because stud-
722 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 56:3:693 
ured the proposition "that social background of personal attributes of judges 
shape personal and policy values that directly influence judicial deci-
sions."140 The study generally agreed with others that sociological back-
ground characteristics are not very helpful in understanding judging.141 
However, the study found that certain nonobjective factors affected judicial 
decisionmaking. 142 They reported that "our study found nearly every prior 
employment variable of these judges, with the exceptions of law professor 
and political experience (and perhaps prosecutorial experience), to be sig-
nificant in some manner."143 
Career aspirations can also affect policy judgments. The study con-
firmed earlier research indicating that advancement affects judges. 144 How-
ever, career considerations may be less influential with administrative 
judges than with conventional judges. Administrative judges tend to be at 
the end of a career path, thus career motives may be less compelling. Still, 
adopting suggestions for countering these motivations may be helpful: "At 
the same time, we have discovered that this variable does not operate in 
isolation but evolves with the circumstances of the litigation and the theo-
retical underpinnings of the case."145 In other words, the system and the 
judges can correct the motivation if they are sensitized to it. 
Of course, less innocent motivations can also affect adjudicators' policy 
initiatives. One study supports the conclusion that judges pursue policy 
preference strategies that are sensitive to political actors.146 In a separate 
empirical study of EPA cases, Jordan concluded: 
I would not characterize these results as demonstrative strategic 
ideological voting. To the contrary, as Judge Wald has argued, they 
ies, legal and behavioral, persist in seeing judges as otherworldly. Even legal realists, who challenge the 
idea that doctrines rule judges, believe that they are ruled by individual equity and sincere policy prefer-
ences rather than general principles. Even those who view judges as just another set of maximizers 
perceive that they maximize their view of social welfare, not-as the rest of us-their personal advan-
tages. Schauer observed: "In sharing this common ground of belief that what really matters to judges are 
their sincere policy preferences ... [investigators] tend to ignore or downplay the possibility that judges, 
no less than legislators and bureaucrats, have strong career-based self-interests that often inform or 
dominate their policy preferences." Schauer. Incentives, supra note 4, at 620. He suggests that we con-
sider the possibility that judges are more driven by rational self-interest than we often concede. ld. at 
620.21. 
140. Sisk et al., supra note 42, at 1385. 
141. ld. at 1387. 
142. ld. at 1470. 
143. ld. Administrative judges might actually be less susceptible to their experience; however, it 
might be significant, for example, that prior prosecutorial experience does not make a difference since 
that is comparable to prior agency staff experience. 
144. ld. at 1493 ("[W]e and Cohen have both confirmed that promotion potential is a factor in under-
standing lower federal court behavior.") (citing Mark Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior of What's 
'Unconstitutional' About the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183 (1991)). 
145. Sisk et al., supra note 42, at 1493. 
146. A study has shown that the Supreme Court is conscious of political actors in setting its agenda. 
See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, & Jennifer Nicoll Victor, Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United 
States Supreme Court: An Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 403 (2002) ("Our analysis 
of the data leads us to conclude that the justices do indeed consider the preferences and likely responses 
of other political actors in deciding whether to grant certiorari."). 
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appear to reflect differences in ... "personalit[ies] and life experi-
ences that lead the judge to vote Democratic or Republican" in the 
first place, rather than adherence to a party or personal ideological 
agenda. 147 
While this is encouraging in terms of partnership, it suggests a challenge to 
objectivity that may create an inappropriate motivation for policy disagree-
ments with the agency. In the end, it is the agency that is to make these 
types of policy judgments.148 A system envisioning a policy role for admin-
istrative judges must control for the impact of personal policy biases. 149 
Administrative judges, more so than their conventional counterparts, 
may also be influenced by public opinion as they contemplate policy moves. 
Administrative officials cannot ignore the community's views in general, 
but the extent to which they should allow their perception of public opinion 
to drive their policy initiatives is complex. At fust glance, the incorporation 
of public-regarding factors might be applauded. However, administrative 
judges' primary concern should be the resolution of individual disputes. 
Therefore, public opinion is arguably inappropriate at this adjudicative 
stage. Moreover, if judges are expected to incorporate public wishes into 
decisions, on what basis should judges determine the best interests of the 
public? This raises the age-old conflict faced by officials in a democratic 
society: Should they decide what is "best," or should they attempt to decide 
what the public wants? An expert theory of the administrative process sug-
gests that adjudicators should be insulated from these factors, but if the ad-
judication is, at a base level, developing policy, then the process cannot 
remain insensitive to the public's views. However, administrative judges 
might not be the proper adjudicators to weigh public opinion since discern-
ing public opinion is arguably outside the realm of their function and exper-
tise. Administrative judges should be sensitive to the public regarding cer-
tain factors yet still leave public opinion to the "political" elements of the 
administrative process. 
All people, including judges, respond to the group of which they are a 
member. 150 Judge Posner observed: 
[E]very judge, trial and appellate, is a member of a community of 
judges-the predecessors and successors of the current judges, as 
147. William Jordan ill, Judges, Ideology, and Policy in the Administrative State: Lessons from a 
Decade of Hard Look Remands of EPA Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 45, 99 (2001) (quoting Patricia M. 
Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the Harvard Law Review and 
Other Great Books, 100 HARv. L. REv. 887,891 (1987)). 
148. Moreover, administrative judges do not have the protections of members of the conventional 
federal judiciary---<:ertainly not the constitutional protection-and might face more deep-rooted incen-
tives. 
149. See supra note 139. 
150. See Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 85, at 161 (stating that "the behavior of judges is primarily 
governed by internally generated norms that can be altogether different from the officially stated organ-
izational rules"). 
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well as the current judges themselves. Judicial decision making is 
collective in a profound sense, and the importance of institutional 
values in such a setting should be self-evident.ISI 
Revesz's studies observed the impact of group politics in the D.C. Cir-
cuit.152 Chief Judge Edwards vituperatively challenged these studies, but 
Edwards appears to accept the effects a judicial community has on deci-
sions.I53 Revesz found, in essence, a tendency towards cooperative behavior 
within the circuit and the individual panels. Cross and Tiller confirmed this 
behavior within the federal circuits and panels and asserted that it is not 
ideology but the dynamics of cooperation that influences judicial behav-
ior.I54 Whether the behavior in the D.C. Circuit or others is crassly partisan 
or even ideological is irrelevant to the inquiry. Notable is that a community 
of judges can be expected to act cooperatively, and hence judicial decisions 
might be distorted by collective influences, perhaps termed internal politics 
or judicial culture. Individual cases should not be affected by this cultural 
ethos. Administrative adjudicative regimes create a variety of communities, 
from agencies with only a few judges to the Social Security Administration 
with some 1100 judges, to the state central panels analyzed below. The best 
solution, in the end, is conscious attention to the dangers. Iss 
Individual or collective motivations can be mitigated by a natural ten-
dency of the judiciary in favor of impartiality and integrity.I56 The "rational 
maximizer" perception of judges would predict behavior in favor of enhanc-
ing individual policy objectives and prestige. However, public choice ad-
mits that this model lacks predictive power regarding judicial behavior, 
though support for this behavior is found in other public officials. Is? Judges 
151. RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 258 (1985); see also Lynn 
Stout, Judges as Altruistic Hierarchs, 43 WM. & MARY L REv. 1605, 1612 (2002) (noting hundreds of 
studies showing that "[a]s a rule of thumb, experimenters have found that cooperation rates in social 
dilemmas average about fifty percent"). Three factors determine socially conscious behavior: a tendency 
to do what one is told by an authority figure, a sense of membership in a common group, and a degree of 
anticipation that one's colleagues will cooperate. /d. at 1615-16. 
152. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, supra note 5; Revesz, Ideology, supra note 5; see also 
Revesz, Litigation and Settlement, supra note 5. 
153. Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making in the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REv. 1335 
(1998); Harry T. Edwards & Linda Elliott, Beware of Numbers (and Unsupponed Claims of Judicial 
Bias), 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 723,723 (2002). 
154. Cross & Tiller, supra note 5, at 2174. But see Richard J. Pierce Jr., Two Problems in Adminis· 
trative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency 
Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 303-07 (explaining decisions by individual policy preferences and 
politics). 
155. Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 85, at 169-70 ("Social sanctions in a closely knit group [such as 
judges] whose members repeatedly interact are likely to be highly effective. If these informal nonlegal 
sanctions work effectively, an expensive, formal enforcement system may be unnecessary."). 
156. Stout demonstrated that judges will try to do the "right thing." Stout, supra note 151, at 1612. 
157. See, e.g., Richard Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody 
Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 1, 2 (1993) ("The economic analyst has a model of how criminals 
and contract parties, injurers and accident victims, parents and spouses-even legislators, and executive 
officials such as prosecutors-act, but falters when asked to produce a model of how judges act."); 
Edward Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institu-
tions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1393, 1399 (1996) ("[N)o stable [public choice) theory has emerged to explain 
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as policymakers cannot be understood simply as rational maximizers in the 
public choice model. Hirschman observed: 
A court, properly briefed, can-and should-ascertain and move in 
the direction of the public interest. ... The courts will not always be 
right As Thomas Kuhn points out, knowledge moves forward on 
wheels of necessary hypotheses. But unlike the radical agnosticism 
of the pure public choice school, it is at least a worthy enterprise. 158 
Judges will do their jobs fairly and faithfully if they are esteemed for 
doing so. 159 This hankering after esteem affects highly visible adjudicators 
in an interesting way: they tend to want to impress academics and joumal-
ists.160 Lower courts are less visible, and hence seek esteem from other 
judges and practitioners. 161 Thus, administrative judges can be expected to 
perform their duties well if their contributions, including their policy roles, 
are valued by the agency and others.162 Agencies at odds with judges over 
proper policy roles likely affect the judges' performances not only in poli-
cymaking but also in other duties. Policy innovations and adjustments give 
judges a chance to shine and offer an opportunity for judges to perform at 
their best Epstein observed that judges are likely to attempt to increase their 
influence and prestige but are forced to do so through excellent decisions. 163 
In general, the pitfalls above do not argue against policy participation 
by administrative judges. Rather, judges should be conscious of potential 
distortions and should be trained to deal with them. 164 Both remedies are 
impeded by ignoring the policymaking role of judges. Careful agency re-
view is necessary to mitigate individual influences in order to develop a 
unified and objective policy. Policy biases expressed in administrative pol-
icy should be those of the agency head who has been delegated that func-
tion, and who will ultimately be held accountable. Moreover, consistency 
and equal treatment within a program requires the unifying influence of the 
agency over administrative judges. Judges perform a formative role in the 
dynamics of policymaking, consequently the system should channel their 
the behavior of judges .... "). 
158. Linda Hirshman, Postmodem Jurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 82 
Nw. U. L. REv. 646,704 (1998) (citation omitted). 
159. Schauer, Incentives, supra note 4, at 573. 
160. /d. at 628. 
161. /d. at 629-31. 
162. But see Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Sub-
stantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. I 051, 1052 (1995) (indicating that while 
"craft" is an important limitation on conventional judges because they care about the perception of their 
competence, administrative Jaw doctrines are more open-ended so that administrative judges have more 
discretion, and hence "craft" is Jess of a limitation on their ideological biases). 
163. Richard Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice 
Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 838 (1990). The structure of the judiciary successfully counteracts 
certain risks./d. at 831-32. 
164. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 137, at 593 ("Probably the key insight of the cognitive 
psychological model is that the policymaking process should be designed to exploit the distinctive 
strengths, and compensate for the distinctive weaknesses, of experts and laypersons."). 
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participation in order to assure integrity in the overall policymaking en-
deavor. 
IV. BUILDING A RECORD FOR POLICYMAKING 
As contributors to the administrative policymaking enterprise, adminis-
trative judges offer original solutions balancing equal treatment and consis-
tency against individualizing and advancing administrative policy. Policy 
evolution is facilitated by administrative judges in an equally significant 
way by developing the record necessary for consideration of policy issues. 
Administrative judges should be aware of their responsibility, and the sys-
tem should provide more opportunities for judges to fulfill this responsibil-
ity. Therefore, considering the development of the policymaking record in 
adjudication is particularly relevant. 
A. An Active Role for Administrative Judges in 
Building a Policymaking Record 
The record provides the policy analysis throughout the adjudicative ma-
chinery with the information needed to develop policy. Policy in adjudica-
tion requires that the facts compiled in the hearing-level record adequately 
support policy determinations and the justification for those decisions. In 
the end, the administrative judges must be responsible for the adequacy of 
the record for this purpose. Fortunately, administrative law permits adminis-
trative adjudicators to actively participate in the development of the re-
cord.165 
Adjudication decides individual rights or duties, consequently it focuses 
on facts related to the specific dispute, "adjudicative facts," and its proce-
dures are designed to serve this purpose. 166 Policymaking requires the de-
velopment of more general or societal facts, called "legislative facts." 167 An 
agency needs legislative facts to support and justif its policy conclusions. 
Obviously, the power to identify and find those facts constitutes a consider-
165. Ventura v. Shala1a, 55 F.3d 900, 902 (3d Cir. 1995) ("AUs have a duty to develop a full and 
fair record in social security cases."); Yanopoulos v. Dep't of the Navy, 796 F.2d 468, 471 (Fed. Cir. 
1986). But see Jeffrey Wolfe & Lisa Proszek, Interaction Dynamics in Federal Administrative Decision 
Making: The Role of the Inquisitorial Judge and the Adversarial Lawyer, 33 TuLSA L.J. 293, 298-302 
(1997). 
166. Adjudicative facts are "facts concerning immediate parties"---<iistinguished from policy-related 
facts or "legislative facts," discussed below. Kenneth Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in 
the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REv. 364, 402 (1942) Kenneth Davis, later to become a major 
administrative law scholar, distinguished adjudicative facts from legislative facts for determining the 
appropriateness of judicial notice. /d. The distinction is also important to the rules regarding judicial 
notice. See FED. R. EviD. 201 advisory committee's note [hereinafter EVIDENCE RULES). 
167. The person who invented the distinction defined such facts: "When a court or an agency devel-
ops law or policy, it is acting legislatively .... [T]he facts which inform the tribunal's legislative judg-
ment may be called legislative facts." 2 KENNETH DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 283 (1960). 
Legislative facts are contrasted from adjudicative facts and the facts necessary to resolve the relevant 
individual dispute. 
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able part of the power to make policy. But, in adjudication, even some spe-
cific facts may be relevant to policy issues. Woolhander's observation is 
particularly important for our purposes: "The line between adjudicative and 
legislative facts is indistinct, however, because decisionmakers use even the 
most particularized facts to make legal rules." 168 In short, the administrative 
adjudicative record must include facts, of whatever category, necessary to 
resolve policy issues as well as resolve the individual dispute. 
Flexible application of the traditional evidentiary rules permitted in 
many administrative adujdicative settings might go some distance to facili-
tate a policymaking record. Administrative adjudications are governed by 
an array of evidentiary rules, most leaving the administrative judge with 
considerable discretion. 169 Evidence is admitted in administrative proceed-
ings for "what it is worth." Evidence clearly relevant to a policy question, 
even if tangential to the specific dispute, might then be admitted as relevant 
to the general resolution of the controversy. 170 
Unfortunately, the administrative hearing, like the trial, is controlled by 
the litigants. The record depends on the quality, energy, and-more signifi-
cantly-the focus of the lawyers. Policy issues usually appear peripheral 
and are rarely directly relevant to the concerns of the individual litigant. The 
parties--even the agency staff-are not motivated to introduce those facts 
because they may not be necessary to resolve the particular dispute. Indeed, 
the parties may have some incentive to divert attention from these facts. At 
the hearing stage, only the administrative judge will likely feel some need 
for a record adequate to resolve pivotal policy issues of a broader nature. 
Yet, in the common-law system, judges have virtually no affirmative duty to 
develop the facts. 171 The judge's role, whether a conventional or administra-
tive judge, is to assure the "quality" of that information by applying certain 
preordained and traditional rules of evidence. 
The common-law tradition inhibits a more active fact-gathering role for 
judges. Yet, somewhat inconsistently, the tradition expects judges to evolve 
the law. This contradiction is even more pronounced in the administrative 
adjudicative context. The system cannot excuse administrative judges from 
assuring an adequate record on facts relevant to policy issues they or the 
agency might face. 172 Agencies must insist that judges perform this role 
168. Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 V AND. L. REV. 
Ill, 114 (1988). 
169. See Richard Pierce, Use of Federal Rules of Evidence in Federal Agency Adjudications, 39 
ADMIN. L. REv. I, 7 (1987). 
170. Often, information supporting policy is technically hearsay, or has the feel of hearsay, and 
administrative law allows it. For example, often such information takes the form of reports and pub-
lished studies. General admissibility of hearsay has been particularly accepted. Richardson v. Perales, 
402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971). But see Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396,405-06 (3d Cir. 2003) (relying 
on unreliable hearsay violates procedural due process). 
171. ABA CODE, supra note 96, at Canon 3(B)[7] ("A judge must not independently investigate facts 
in a case and must consider only the evidence presented."). 
172. Administrative law envisions an active role for administrative judges in assuring the adequate 
development of specific or adjudicative facts as well. 2 KocH, supra note 2, § 5.25[2]. It creates a 
substantial tension between this duty and the common-law tradition of passive judging. However, this 
piece focuses on perhaps the more compelling conceptual problem of providing an adequate record for 
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because policy judgments must be supported in a variety of arenas-
including judicial review. Traditionally, policy decisions were subject to 
review under an abuse of discretion or arbitrariness standard. 173 Though 
limited scrutiny, these word formulas often result in a test of whether the 
agency considered all possibilities and had adequate support for its policy 
conclusions. 174 Therefore, the administrative judge must assure an adequate 
record exists for policymaking, especially when the litigants are not likely 
to do so. 
Administrative judges must assure that the record contains the neces-
sary technical information. Policy resolution may depend on expertise in a 
number of nonlegal disciplines. Administrative law grants considerable def-
erence to the agency's expert judgment and the judges must be empowered 
to actively build this aspect of the record. 175 Administrative judges have 
considerable discretion to admit expert evidence.176 The administrative 
judge may rely on an agency expert, 177 but administrative judges rarely have 
independent authority to seek other expert advice or even to call their own 
experts. 178 While party control of the record is acceptable for adjudicative 
issues, the policymaking function of adjudication would be greatly en-
hanced if administrative judges could actively seek experts related to the 
issues. If the expert's testimony is likely to be important to the particular 
adjudication, the judge could present the expert for examination by the par-
focuses on perhaps the more compelling conceptual problem of providing an adequate record for poli-
cymaking in adjudication within the common-law tradition. 
173. E.g., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 98 
n.8 (1983). 
[A]n agency acting within its authority to make policy choices consistent with the congres-
sional mandate should receive considerable deference from courts, provided, of course, that 
its actions conform to applicable procedural requirements and are not "arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion, or not otherwise in accordance with law." 
ld.; Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357, 1371 (lith Cir. 2002) (finding the agency's policy was not 
arbitrary). 
174. E.g., City of Dallas, Tex. v. FCC, 165 F. 3d 341, 355 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e affirm the Commis-
sion's policy choice if it considered competing arguments and articulated a reasonable basis for its 
conclusions."). 
175. Marsh v. Ore. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989) ("Because analysis of the rele-
vant documents 'requires a high level of technical expertise,' we must defer to 'the informed discretion 
of the responsible federal agency."') (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976)); Ford 
Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) ("Administrative agencies are simply better 
suited than courts to engage in such [an expert] process."). 
176. EVIDENCE RuLEs, supra note 166, at Rule 702. This rule requires only that the evidence prof-
fered be reliable and relevant, and hence even a court need not assure that the expert's views are gener-
ally accepted. Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993). 
177. Sabine River Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 678 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
506 u.s. 823 (1992). 
178. Under the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, judges may seek legal advice only. ABA CODE, 
supra note 96, at Canon 3(B). JEFFREY SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 173 (2000) 
("While judges may, under certain circumstances, obtain advice concerning the law from disinterested 
experts, the exception does not extend to experts in other areas."). 1n the Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct, access is intentionally narrowed to "legal" experts, which as discussed below, if read generously, 
might be valuable in policy judgments. Consultation with other types of experts is prohibited for mem-
bers of the judiciary, but administrative law might take a different view. /d. § 5.07. 
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ties. However, if the expert's advice goes to general policy issues, the ad-
vice would enter the record. 179 
A procedure is needed which would allow a judge to complete the poli-
cymaking aspect of the adjudicative record without offending traditional 
principles to the point of invalidating the adjudication. 180 "Official" or "ad-
ministrative" notice is one traditional method for empowering a judge to 
affirmatively build the policymaking record. Conceptually, official notice is 
the same as judicial notice. It enters facts into the record without the need 
for formal "proof." Federal Rule of Evidence 201 distinguishes between 
adjudicative facts and legislative facts, and focuses on the process for intro-
ducing certain categories of adjudicative facts. After some opportunity for 
comment, some adjudicative facts may be noticed without proof. The Fed-
eral Rules provide no procedures for admitting legislative facts. The com-
mentators asserted that "the judge is unrestricted in his investigation and 
conclusion [regarding legislative facts, and] the parties do not more than to 
assist; they control no part of the process."181 The finder of fact with unbri-
dled discretion regarding the admission of legislative facts possesses "a 
dangerous freedom." 182 The best practice in administrative adjudications, 
regardless of the practice in courts, is to offer some opportunity for com-
ment. This was recently confirmed by the Supreme Court: "[I]t is well es-
tablished that, as long as a party has an opportunity to respond, an adminis-
trative agency may take official notice of such 'legislative facts' within its 
special knowledge, and is not confined to the evidence in the record in 
reaching its expert judgment."183 Official notice offers the administrative 
judge a well-established device for obtaining the range of information nec-
essary to build the policy-related part of the record. Consequently, judges 
should use it creatively and more often. 
In addition, the administrative judge might consider whether options 
beyond those provided by the litigants are necessary for a full airing of the 
179. The administrative process might learn from the civil-law system in which the judges consult 
the experts. CATHERINE ELLIOTT & CATHERINE VERNON, FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 129 (2000) (''The 
judge's powers concerning oral evidence are very wide .... The French judge has even greater powers 
in connection with expert evidence, as the normal practice is for a single neutral expert appointed by the 
court. Parties do not normally appoint their own experts."); ANDREW WEST ET AL., THE FRENCH LEGAL 
SYSTEM 297 (1998) ("It is for the judge to choose the expert .... ").However, the ABA CODE, supra 
note 96, specifically rejects this alternative. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 178, at 172 ("Unlike the Euro-
pean system, in which judges have the primary responsibility for the development of litigative facts, 
American judges are generally permitted only to consider the evidence and testimony that is produced by 
counsel."). 
180. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESfORING A 
PRAGMATIC BALANCE 158-64 (2003) (explaining various adjudicative procedures used by agencies to 
adjust the scope of regulation, including waivers, deadline extensions, and exceptions). 
181. EVIDENCE RULES, supra note 166, Rule 20l(a) advisory committee's note (quoting Henry 
Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REv. 269, 270-71 (1994), although the quote referred to "domes-
tic law"). 
182. Peggy C. Davis, There Is a Book Out ... An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative 
Facts, 100 HARV. L REv. 1539, 1541 (1987); see also Woolhandler, supra note 168. 
183. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 298 (2000) (emphasis added) (accepting the city 
council's findings regarding the harmful effect of nude dancing in a particular area of the city). 
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policy issue. Liberal intervention might be one established method allowing 
a judge to expand contributions to the record. Intervention allows the judge 
to permit other interested persons to raise, support, and discuss policy is-
sues. Liberal intervention in administrative proceedings allows participation 
that is tangential to the specific dispute. 184 Over the years, administrative 
law has developed a sliding scale of intervention in which interested persons 
might participate in various forms, ranging from full party status to filing 
documents on a specific issue.185 Administrative judges might be particu-
larly sensitive to interveners who will contribute to the agency's, as well as 
their own, policy decisions. 
Unfortunately, interested persons are unlikely to know about the con-
sideration of policy issues or have the wherewithal to participate in their 
resolution, especially in mass justice programs. Thus, the administrative 
judge must be the key person. The judges must assure that key opinions are 
found in the record to support their policy judgments, and ultimately those 
of the agency. However, permitting a judge to actually solicit intervention to 
obtain wide policy views challenges our adjudicative traditions. However, 
within bounds, jud~es should be allowed to do so-relying on Wyman-
Gordon for support. 86 Yet where the need strays too far beyond the focus of 
the individual dispute, the better approach may be to note the need and 
leave the job of considering how to incorporate broader participation to the 
agency. The agency may choose to exercise its rulemaking authority, an 
option unavailable to the judge. 
Administrative judges have the authority to gather legislative facts and 
may have a duty to seek these facts when a policy issue is perceived. But, 
do administrative judges possess the authority to find policy-related facts, 
especially where the facts are not directly related to the case before them? 
Clearly, the agency's findings would be enhanced by preliminary findings 
by the judge responsible for providing the information necessary to make 
the finding-who is also in the position of applying the findings as well as 
the policy. Thus, administrative judges must have some authority to find 
policy-related facts. Especially, as this Article advocates, to the extent that 
administrative judges take part in the policymaking process. One obstacle 
facing policy analysis at the administrative judge level is the capacity of 
judges to find policy-related facts. Their expertise and experience might be 
insufficient to resolve the broad and technical facts related to a larger policy 
question. However, they are experienced factfinders and possess a certain 
type of experience and expertise. Thus, in the end, their initial findings will 
be valuable to an administrative review of the findings. 
184. APA, supra note 11, at§ 555(b) ("So far as the orderly conduct of public business permits, an 
interested person may appear before an agancy or its responsible employees for presentation, adjustment, 
or determination of an issue, request, or controversy .... "). 
185. Brice Claggett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rulemaking: Some Recent Developments in 
Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKEL.J. 51. 
186. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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In sum, administrative judges have a duty to assure an adequate record 
so that the administrative review authority can engage in policy analysis. 
Traditional record-building notions must be modified to create additional 
techniques to facilitate administrative judges carrying out this duty. Admin-
istrative law's openness to such modifications could form the legal and ethi-
cal foundation for enabling these powers. However, more than a responsi-
bility to compile facts is necessary, some duty to engage in a preliminary 
finding of policy-related facts also seems appropriate. 
B. Potential Unfairness from Injecting Policy-Oriented 
Facts into an Individual Adjudication 
Assigning administrative judges the responsibility to find policy-related 
facts raises a question of fairness of particular concern to the private litigant. 
For example, a hearing-level judge's concern for the policy-related record 
might compel the judge to find facts not directly relevant to adjudicating the 
particular dispute. The litigants, both the private litigant and the agency 
staff, are now engaged in a policymaking proceeding and acquire the re-
sponsibility for representing either the established policy or a need for ad-
justment. This is an unfair burden. 187 A judge must weigh the fairness of 
doing what is essentially "agency" business at the expense of the private 
party. Still, the hearing level is generally the fact-gathering and finding ad-
judicative stage, and administrative judges remain the vehicle likely to be 
most effective in assuring such support. 
Failure to confront the policy issues at the hearing level merely passes 
the fairness question to the administrative review authority. Suppose that 
authority, representing the agency, finds that it cannot resolve the larger 
policy dispute on the record before it. Unless it is satisfied to make general 
policy on inadequate facts, it is left with making the decision on its own 
experience and expertise, engaging in legislative fact-gathering itself, or 
returning the individual dispute for general policy-oriented facts. Any of 
these would force it to choose between inadequate supporting information 
and imposing an external burden on the litigants. 
Where it cannot comfortably rely on the existing record and its own ex-
pertise, the administrative review authority might seek to improve the poli-
cymaking aspects of the adjudicative record. Traditionally, this body has 
more authority to add to the record than the courts. It does not violate due 
process to supplement the record after the hearing if the parties are notified 
of the intention to do so. 188 Whatever limits exist might be less relevant to 
the addition of more broadly focused policy-oriented facts and comments. 
187. Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 430 
(1981) ("A policy decision made in response to a highly focused grievance can easily impinge on per-
sons not directly involved."). 
188. McQuiddy v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 888 F.2d 1047, 1048-49 (5th Cir. 1989). 
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Nonetheless, this solution imposes a burden on the litigants, and superim-
poses a tangential inquiry on their individual dispute. 
Moreover, if the agency engages in policymaking at the administrative 
review level, other interested persons will want an opportunity to contribute 
facts and comments. The agency may feel competent to consider the addi-
tional interests injected into the adjudication, but those affected by the adju-
dicative-developed policy may feel excluded.189 In addition, there is no 
guarantee that affected persons will even know of the new or adjusted pol-
icy, since-unlike rule changes-policy may be changed in adjudication 
without notice to all those potentially affected. The agency may be required 
to consider any new material evidence, but the duty to assure sufficient op-
portunity for comment should extend beyond that requirement. 190 
Adjudicative policy development then presents the dual fairness issues 
of the undue burden on the litigants to endure tangential inquiries and the 
possible exclusion of those affected by that policy. The focus of the individ-
ual dispute resolution is deflected to the detriment of the litigants and the 
adjudicative process, either at the hearing or appellate level, and is not well-
suited to attracting a wide range of views. In short, supporting policymaking 
in the adjudicative context might be unfair both to the individual litigants 
and to the affected public. Still, as we have seen, adjudication cannot ignore 
policy issues, and hence it must assure an adequate record for those issues. 
An agency must confront these fairness issues in developing policy in adju-
dication. In those cases in which the policy issue creates unfairness, the 
agency-perhaps at the recommendation of the judge-should consider 
rulemaking rather than case-by-case development of policy. 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF COORDINATE ADJUDICATIVE MODELS 
So far, the discussion has assumed the traditional hierarchical adjudica-
tive structure. In the traditional model, the adjudicative bureaucracy is in-
ternal and part of an organization in which the agency head is the final au-
thority. However, not every administrative adjudicative system follows this 
model. In some systems, the adjudicative machinery is structurally sepa-
rated from the "administrative" functions. In these systems, the adjudicative 
bureaucracy is coordinated rather than internal. Having investigated a gen-
eralized "hierarchical" model, we next look at the variations in those pro-
grams using a separate or "coordinate" structure. 
189. Those interests have the right to petition for rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e), but it is not likely to 
satisfy them. 
190. Peabody Coal Co. v. Ferguson, 140 F.3d 634, 637 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that the opportunity 
to present new evidence to address changes in legal standards is required by due process); Williams v. 
Sullivan, 905 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that a party must be given an opportunity to chal-
lenge information obtained after the hearing); Wallace v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1989); 
Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. FERC, 650 F.2d 683, 687 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding the consideration of new 
evidence improper unless the parties have notice). 
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Coordinated adjudicative processes can be divided into two categories. 
One coordinate model, taking over state administrative adjudications, sepa-
rates the administrative judges into an independent and central hearing of-
fice providing judges to a wide range of agencies. The second model, the 
"split function" model, delegates the adjudicative function to an agency 
separate from that responsible for program administration and hence pro-
gram policy development. Each model raises somewhat different questions 
for policymaking in adjudication. 
A. A Centralized and Separate Office of Administrative Judges 
Half the states have centralized and independent hearing offices, known 
generally as a "central panel" or, better, a "central hearing agency." 191 This 
structure wreaks havoc with the traditional administrative model in several 
ways, but here we need to focus only on its implications for policymaking. 
Given the fantastic increase in adjudication at the state level, the trend to-
wards this model in the states, and the prospect-unrealized to date-that 
the federal government may move in that direction, the implications are 
important to this inquiry. In addition, the more visible division of labor re-
vealed by these processes helps illuminate the issues discussed above. 
As argued above, a dynamic system of administrative policy develop-
ment starts with the administrative judges and the hearing level. It follows 
that this developmental mechanism gives administrative judges some free-
dom to question established policy, and under certain circumstances to re-
fuse to apply that policy to the individual case, even when its application is 
not ambiguous. It is equally necessary that the agency have the final author-
ity regarding policy. That authority is necessary for uniformity and consis-
tency. Individual dispute resolution cannot be allowed to make the program 
generally arbitrary. 
The independent hearing office structure upsets this balance. Because 
the program agencies lose control, the interests of consistency and equality 
require a strong commitment to rules and superior precedent. The panel 
judges, since they serve many agencies, are generalists and thus do not pro-
vide the expertise and experience inherent in the traditional scheme. 192 The 
administrative judges are largely denied the opportunity to participate in the 
evolution of policy. Judges who stray from prior decisions exercise a kind 
of capriciousness rather than participating in the evolution of administrative 
191. Hanagan identified 25 states and at least three major cities that have proposed federal adjudica-
tion for years. James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State Administrative Law Judge: Central 
Panels and Their Impact on State AU Authority and Standards of Agency Review, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 
1355, 1357 (2002); see also Scalia, supra note 42, at 79 ("The problem of improper influence would also 
be solved by implementing proposals for establishment of a unified AU corps, headed by an independ-
ent administrator."). For several reasons, the unified panel has not been adopted in the federal system. 
VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 40, at I 71-74. 
192. Edward Tomlinson, The Maryland Administrative Procedure Act: Forty Years Old in 1997, 56 
MD. L. REv. 196, 253 (1997) ("The substitution of generalist central office AUs for specialist agency 
hearing examiners is nevenheless likely to reduce the role of expenise."). 
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policy. This creates the danger of inconsistent policy application and re-
moves the street-level experience from the policy process. 
In addition, the panel structure replaces a specialized, program-sensitive 
judicial community with an isolated, generalist administrative judiciary. In a 
sense, this independent office suggests a community more like the tradi-
tional judiciary. While this accomplishes the goal of structural independ-
ence, it generates a different, but not necessarily beneficial, group dy-
namic.193 Several studies, discussed above, show that judges work within 
the ethos of their judicial community. The independent hearing office will 
affect policy development and application. In short, this independence has a 
price. 
Some of the disadvantages may be offset by courts reviewing the result 
of the independent hearing office judge's decision in which the agency has 
rejected the judge's policy conclusions. If the court limits itself to reviewing 
the agency's policy conclusions and ignoring those of the administrative 
judge, then it will put the agency back in charge of its policy. However, if 
the court weighs the two policy conclusions and chooses the one it prefers, 
it arrogates power to itself as well as destroys the agency's control over its 
policy. Neither is optimal for the operation of an administrative program, 
for the reasons given above. 
The division also creates the specter of policymaking through litigation 
strategy. If the policy is at issue, it means that the policy did not exist or is 
unclear at the time of the administrative adjudication. The agency must fill 
the gap through its litigation position at the administrative hearing, unin-
formed by an opportunity to review the administrative judge's efforts. The 
agency, even in adjudication, should not be defining policy as an advocate. 
Moreover, much of the decision will be made by the litigation staff, further 
compromising the objectivity of the policy analysis. On balance, it is better 
to hold the separate adjudicative agency to the agency's litigation position, 
but even if this occurs, policymaking has been robbed of the interaction 
between the administrative judge and the agency on the policy issue. Hence, 
Flanagan observed that the "more subtle effect of ALJ independence ... is 
the loss of agency experience in the application of the law and regula-
tions."194 
Generally, the central office system forces agencies to make most pol-
icy moves by rules. Many see this as a good thing; commentators over the 
years, starting with Justice Jackson in Chenery II, would force agencies in 
193. The empirical study by Guthrie. Rachlinski, and Witrich of errors caused by cognitive illusions, 
discussed above, supports the value of specialization on the bench. Guthrie et al., supra note 131, at 825 
("[J]udicial decision making might also benefit from specialization on the bench."). Judge Wood argues 
that specialization makes judging more complex and difficult to understand. Diane P. Wood, Generalist 
Judges in a Specialized World, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 1755, 1767 (1997). On specialization generally, see 
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving Business 
Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1995); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. 
REv. 377. 
194. Flanagan, supra note 191, at 1406. 
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this direction. 195 Indeed, the administrative law of some states requires 
rulemaking. 196 Added to that is the growing trend in the states to force agen-
cies to make rules only through notice-and-comment rulemaking, and hence 
assure general participation in the policymaking. An unfortunate conse-
quence is that the agency is doubly inhibited in the development of policy. 
First, it cannot use the adjudication to inform itself on the application and 
change of circumstances. Second, it cannot use guidance documents to dis-
close any new policy thinking or cautiously evolve policy without making 
an ultimate final commitment and engaging in full-blown rulemaking. 
The panel system presents an ambiguity as to the effect of rules on the 
adjudication. The administrative judges' position as a team of generalist 
judges, separated into an adjudicating agency, casts them more as an admin-
istrative court. 197 If panel judges are seen as separate courts then it might 
follow that they are bound only by legislative rules-rules made pursuant to 
delegated authority. In the internalized hierarchical model, the agency's 
duty is to obey its own rules. While some freedom in application by the 
judges is suggested above, such policy pronouncements nonetheless express 
the authoritative view of the agency and hence must be given considerable 
force at the hearing level. When the judges are not structurally part of the 
agency, a fundamental question arises as to whether they are governed by 
the second principle at all. In that case, they might be empowered to give all 
rules without the "force of law" no more than Skidmore "power to per-
suade" deference. 
Thus the panel system encourages administrative judges to engage in 
independent policymaking in several ways. But, where do panel judges get 
the policy they use in their own policy analysis? Is it too glib to say that 
they have independent authority to interpret the statute and merely go di-
rectly to the statutory language? After all, agency policy pronouncements 
are not actual "interpretations" but rather a product of the responsibility to 
carry forward the legislative policy and to make policy. 198 When panel 
judges circumvent the agency's policymaking and engage in their own pol-
icy development, even in the guise of statutory interpretation, they short-
circuit the intended operation of the administrative process and rob it of one 
of its major advantages. 
More importantly, when judges circumvent agency policymaking, they 
inject their own policy biases into the system and arrogate policymaking 
power. This Article has previously discussed legitimate sources of policy 
analysis upon which administrative judges may rely. Also suggested is the 
idea that administrative judges acting in a hierarchical process perform an 
195. E.g .. Gifford, supra note 41, at 982. 
196. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
197. William Swent, South Carolina's AU: Central Panel, Administrative Court, or a Little of 
Both?, 48 S.C. L. REV. I, 6 (1996) ("Opponents of reform parse the phrase 'creepingjudicialization' and 
worry about the erosion of agency policy and clout."). 
198. Chenery 11, supra note 13, at 194. 
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important function by questioning existing policy from their applied per-
spective or initiating change. In contrast, judges outside the agency, whose 
policy judgments have some finality, create potential injustice and poor 
program administration. If they are to engage in policy forays, then it is 
extremely important that their efforts are reviewed by the agency in order to 
protect the agency's delegated policymaking function and guard against 
improperly motivated policy judgments. The panels system unfortunately 
weakens agency review as a practical matter. 
In addition, Flanagan observed that along with the panels, a second 
trend somewhat related to the panel movement has emerged in which state 
administrative judges issue decisions that are largely beyond the reach of 
the agencies. "This may be done directly, by eliminating agency review on 
most issues decided by an ALJ, or indirectly, by making it difficult or im-
possible for the agency to modify the ALJs [sic] decision."199 In essence, 
this "final order" regime shifts policy enforcement-and to some extent 
evolution-to the courts. This shift deprives the administrative adjudication 
of much of its value. First, the agency, not the courts, is intended and con-
structed to make policy. Second, the courts become a competing policymak-
ing authority, resulting in bifurcated and confused policy development. 
It is not clear that this shift to judicial policymaking makes the policy 
less political. In fact, the shift may be a reaction to uncontrollable objectiv-
ity, centralized decisionmaking, or a certain brand of politics-not politics 
itself.200 Most state judges are elected and, contrary to commentary and the 
ABA, the electorate is more insistent than ever on that system of selecting 
judges?01 While the agencies themselves are political, their decisions are 
usually the result of the kind of objective, expert judgments they were cre-
ated to provide.Z02 This is reinforced by the courts under some limiting re-
199. Hanagan, supra note 191, at 1359. 
200. See Hardwicke, supra note 90, at 423 ("[L]egislatures instinctively distrust an expanding, inde-
pendent judiciary."). 
201. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, CALL TO ACTION: STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL 
SUMMIT ON IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION 7 (2002), at htip://www.ncsconline.org/D _Research/CallT 
oActionCommentary.pdf (2002) ("Eighty-seven percent of state appellate and trial judges are selected 
through direct or retention elections."). The report of the ABA's Commission on the 21st Century Judi-
ciary states: 
The Commission opposes the use of judicial elections as a means of initial selection and rese-
lection .... The Commission acknowledges, though, that support for judicial elections re-
mains entrenched in many states. With that in mind, the Commission offers a series of alter-
native judicial selection recommendations aimed at ameliorating some of the deleterious ef-
fects of elections on the enduring principles of a good judicial system. 
/d. This is not the official position of the ABA. and traditionally the ABA has been even less accepting 
of elected judges. American Bar Association Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary Principles and 
Conclusions, at htip://www.abanet.org/leadership/2003/joumalll03.pdf (Aug. 2003). 
202. An empirical study in North Carolina produced results that suggest objective judgments. Daye, 
supra note 44. The panel judges agreed with the agency in 76% of the cases. !d. at 1615. Agency review 
reversed ALJ decisions in favor of the agency in a significant number of cases, although the number of 
these reversals was quite disproportionate to reversal of pro-petitioner cases. /d. at 1617. Still, the 
agency review produced only a 9.5% increase in agency-favorable decisions. /d. at 1619. Flanagan 
concluded from the whole body of data "that agency review produces results that are supported by the 
Jaw and the facts." 
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view standard or instruction, hence the courts and the agency check each 
other. Making the courts the sole arbiter of administrative policy changes 
the politics in both kind and degree. 
Moreover, only a few decisions from panel judges are subject to judicial 
challenge, thus the administrative judge's decision is the final word. Asi-
mow observed: 
So the real result is the ALJ makes the policy. And when an AU, 
for example, makes a big holding in favor of the private party, 
which is followed as precedent by other ALJs, a regulatory or bene-
ficiary program can be halted in its tracks until the agency secures a 
legislative change?03 
For these reasons, there is much to be said for Texas's attempt to allo-
cate functions so that the agency retains authority over policy. Thus, the 
Texas statute authorized the agency to reverse ALJ decisions only on ques-
tions of "policy."204 The absence of a workable definition of policy led it to 
shift to specific grounds upon which the agency may be reversed. Given the 
values discussed here, it might be better to give the agency some freedom to 
justify their actions on the basis of protecting administrative policy. Indeed, 
this is reminiscent of Chenery II in which the U.S. Supreme Court gave the 
agency the opportunity to demonstrate that it engaged in its policy devel-
opment function. 205 A court should be able to measure the performance of 
agency policymaking responsibility without becoming a second policy-
maker. 
What is really needed is a thoughtful effort to recapitulate in the panel 
system the policy exchange and allocation of authority inherent in a hierar-
chical system. Such a system means that the agency must have some author-
ity to reverse the judges on policy grounds. On the other hand, it means that 
judges should be encouraged to experiment with policy adjustments so long 
as the agency can accept or reject their efforts. Central office systems 
should also develop formal vehicles for the judges to add their experience in 
applying policy to the information available to the agency. Panel judges, for 
example, could have the opportunity to identify cases which show a need 
for adjustment or new policy. Indeed, an agency may ask the hearing office 
for periodic reports on potential policy initiatives and changes. 
B. Split-Function Models 
A few administrative schemes, known as "split-function" or "split-
enforcement" models, separate the adjudicative function and the enforce-
203. Michael Asimow, correspondence (on file with the author). 
204. Flanagan, supra note 191, at 1371. 
205. See Chenery l/, supra note 13, at 194. 
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ment and policy function into two separate agencies.206 One agency makes 
policy through rulemaking and enforcement strategy while a separate 
agency adjudicates violations of that policy.207 While presenting divided 
policymaking results in dangers similar to the panel systems, these are 
structurally different in two ways. First, split-function systems are confined 
to one program, while the panels serve a range of programs. Second, and 
more important for our purposes, the adjudicative hierarchy is self-
contained; both hearings and review are conducted within the separate adju-
dicating agency?08 
At one point, this scheme had a number of advocates. Gifford argued: 
"When these [administrative] tasks raise numerous policy issues [in agJudi-
cation] ... then the alternative [split-function] structure is optimal."2 Ex-
perience has not been as kind. Shapiro and McGarity concluded: "[The Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Review Commission] is the creature of a 
failed experiment with the split-enforcement model."210 Strauss had a simi-
lar negative reaction to the actual results of the split-function model in min-
ing. 211 Because of these studies, the split-function model has lost its mo-
mentum. Nonetheless, Fallon argues for the split-function model in air 
safety even though he recognizes the loss of some of the policy evolution 
advantages.212 Is there anything different about air safety, when compared to 
mine safety and employee safety, which changes the calculus? The different 
conclusions might result from a different balance in the perceived advan-
tages. The gains from agency participation in the adjudicative process for 
Fallon do not outweigh the gains from clear separation. Administrative law 
commentators such as Shapiro, McGarity, and Strauss, find more formida-
ble benefits from agency control over policy questions in adjudication. 
The split-function model also offends administrative law thinking by · 
eliminating agency discretion to choose between policy development 
through rulemaking and adjudication. Tradition, affirmed by Wyman-
Gordon among others, allows the agency to decide which avenue to pur-
sue.213 Administrative law has established that this discretion has significant 
advantages, several of which are rehearsed above. Strauss argues that by 
206. See Gifford, supra note 41, at 1000-01. 
207. The most visible such programs are in the federal system. However, many states also have 
programs that fit the basic split-function model. Most pervasive of these is workers compensation, which 
has an agency to adjudicate employee injury and health complaints. See id. (explaining the history of the 
movement toward split-function systems). 
208. See George R. Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA 
and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 315,349 (1987). 
209. Gifford, supra note 41, at 971 . 
210. Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and 
Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. I, 62 (1989). 
211. Peter L. Strauss, Rules, Adjudication, and Ocher Sources of l.nw in an Executive Depanment: 
Reflections on the Interior Depanment's Administration of the Mining Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1231 
(1974). 
212. Richard H. Fallon, Jr .. Enforcing Aviation Safety Regulations: The Case for a Split-Enforcement 
Model of Agency Adjudication, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 389, 392-93 (1991). 
213. See supra note 19. 
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eliminating the ability to choose among policymaking methods, the split-
function model prevents the agency from finding the best process for devel-
oping policy.214 
The Supreme Court defused concern over the aspect of split-function 
schemes that most troubled administrative law commentators. Many wor-
ried that the courts would arrogate power in arbitrating disputes between the 
agency and the adjudicative body. In Martin v. OSHRC,215 the Supreme 
Court found that Congress intended for the Secretary of Labor's policy 
judgments to control over those of the Occupational Safety and Health Re-
view Commission (OSHRC).216 It concluded that "Congress did not intend 
to sever the power authoritatively to interpret OSH Act regulations from the 
Secretary's power to promulgate and enforce them."217 The agency's inter-
pretations are dominant even if offered in the context of an administrative 
adjudication before the adjudicating body: "Under these circumstances, the 
Secretary's litigating position before the Commission is as much an exercise 
of delegated lawmaking powers as is the Secretary's promulgation of a 
workplace health and safety standard."218 Thus, reviewing courts as well as 
the adjudicating agency may not exercise independent policy judgment. 
Still, because the administrative review authority is not under the con-
trol of the agency, the system loses the policymaking contribution inherent 
in the appellate process. The bifurcation of responsibility prevents the 
agency from engaging in the traditional interstitial policymaking and totally 
excludes adjudicators from contributing to policymaking. Taking the adju-
dicators out of the policy development process is even more undesirable 
here than with respect to the panel systems. The split-function adjudicators 
are specialists, whereas the hearing judges in the panel structure are more 
like generalist judges who claim no special expertise in the subject matter. 
Thus, split-function adjudicators have potentially more to offer. This means 
that the system loses more by taking them out of the policymaking function. 
Also, they are most likely more frustrated than panel judges at their inability 
to participate, perhaps leading them to seek means with which to inject their 
own policy judgments. Mintz concluded that, while the Supreme Court has 
clearly instructed the OSHRC that policy questions are to be left to the La-
bor Department, "The Review Commission ... has not [done so]; we may 
then suggest that an adjudicatory agency does not easily reconcile itself to a 
non-policy role as would a prosecutory official, such as the General Coun-
sel."219 In short, the split-function model presents disadvantages from all 
perspectives of the policymaking task. 
214. Strauss, supra note 208, at 1258-59. 
215. Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144 (1991). 
216. /d. at 154-55. 
217. !d. at 157-58; see also Allegheny Teledyne, Inc. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (agreeing with the trial court that "only the interpretation of the agency that promulgated the 
regulation matters"). 
218. Manin, 499 U.S. at !57. 
219. Benjamin W. Mintz, Administrative Separation of Functions: OSHA and the NLRB, 47 CATH. 
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CONCLUSION 
The administrative process augments two seemingly distinct govern-
mental functions: resolving individual disputes and developing government 
policy. Agencies perform these functions under a mandate from the legisla-
ture and within the confines of that mandate. Most agencies are afforded 
substantial policymaking authority within their delegated responsibility. 
Indeed, the need for policy development beyond the legislative mandate is 
usually the reason for choosing an administrative approach over other alter-
natives for confronting a societal problem. Often this function is performed 
by a process focused on policymaking, usually some form of "rulemaking." 
In contrast, administrative adjudications determine individual rights and 
duties created through an administrative program. However, agency adjudi-
cators must work with agency policy, hence even individual dispute resolu-
tion interacts with the policymaking function. This interaction in tum con-
tributes to the body of administrative policy or agency law. The operation of 
administrative policy development within the administrative adjudicative 
machinery has been the focus of this Article. 
In looking at the internal performance of policy making in adjudication, 
we see a division of functions among the various adjudicative officials. Like 
the conventional judiciary, administrative judiciaries have hierarchies of 
decisionmakers, and administrative adjudicative officials at each level have 
different roles within the adjudicative machinery. Each actor contributes 
differently to the interpretation of statutes, rules, and other adjudicative de-
cisions, to factfinding, and to the policy analysis necessary to the resolution 
of the individual disputes. This Article focused on the part played by hear-
ing-level officials, the administrative judges, and the context in which they 
perform. The administrative judges launch the policy analysis as both record 
builders and initial decisionmakers. All other participants in the adjudicative 
process, including the courts, work from this initial policy analysis. How-
ever, each participant confronts its own policymaking demands. Thus, each 
system must find its own balance between the responsibility to do individual 
justice in adjudications and the need to evolve and control policy. This Arti-
cle has attempted to provide the foundation and framework for doing so. 
U. L. REv. 877,917 (1998) (comparing the operation of OSHA's split-function process with the separa-
tion of prosecutorial and policymaking functions in the NLRB ). 
